Revisiting EU Member States’ international cultural relations

A report to the European Cultural Foundation updating research undertaken by the author in 2009 on whether there had been a paradigm shift in EU Member States’ cultural relations with Third countries.

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International Intelligence on Culture
April 2011
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Executive Summary

1. This research was to update a study undertaken by Rod Fisher in 2009 on whether there was evidence of a paradigm shift in European Union Member States’ relations with Third countries from traditional cultural diplomacy policies towards more strategically focused international cultural co-operation.

2. Revisiting the research was necessary before its publication in a book on cultural diplomacy in Autumn 2011, to probe anecdotal and other evidence suggesting that the economic situation was beginning to impact on cultural relations budgets, as well as to take account of new policies and structural change that had occurred in the two years since the initial study.

3. The new research revealed once again that the terminology was often applied in a loose way in policy statements and political pronouncements, with terms such as cultural diplomacy, cultural co-operation, cultural exchange and cultural relations used interchangeably without appreciation of the subtle, but important, difference in meaning. This makes policy analysis more complex.

4. The most noticeable changes have been budgetary reductions to cultural relations programmes, personnel and, in some cases, national cultural institutes, evident to varying degrees in the majority of EU Member States examined. The cutbacks in some instances have been quite severe. There are a few exceptions including – rather unexpectedly given its serious economic problems – the Republic of Ireland, though this is attributable largely to a major one-off Irish cultural season in the USA.

5. New policy developments are particularly evident in countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden. Policy change outside the EU can be seen for example in South Korea and the USA.

6. Recent organizational changes are most evident in France and Hungary and to a lesser extent in Portugal and Italy.
7. The new research notes the increasing use made of digital tools to achieve cultural relations objectives, which raises questions on whether priority should be given to programmes and projects utilising new modes of communication, but with uncertain long term outcomes, or to more ‘slow burn’ initiatives.

8. There has been a rapid expansion in the past two years of the European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC) and its cultural hubs across the world, which are facilitating greater co-operation between such bodies. Some smaller countries value the platform and profile that EUNIC gives them; others remain concerned about the domination of the “big three” (France, Germany and the UK).

9. The research notes the surprising absence of cultural responsibilities from the tasks of personnel posts announced in the initial roll out of EU delegations across the globe by its new European External Action Service.

10. Geographical priorities of EU States have remained broadly the same with a continuing focus on the BRIC nations, the Middle East, Turkey and Indonesia, though South Africa and Mexico are increasingly on the radar. However, budgetary cutbacks are likely to limit the extent to which cultural relations with these priority countries are likely to be pursued by some EU States. Only a few EU Member States are demonstrating, through their resource allocations, a serious commitment to cultural relations with the European Union Neighbourhood Partnership countries.

11. The need for greater policy cohesion between different government departments continues to be an issue and the research cites an example where a policy disconnect between ministries is frustrating international cultural co-operation.
Introduction

In 2009 Rod Fisher was invited to brief European Commission staff on whether there was evidence of a paradigm shift in EU Member States cultural relations with Third countries from traditional cultural diplomacy policies to more strategically focused international cultural co-operation. He had been asked to focus especially on relations with industrialised countries and growing economies in North America, Latin America and Asia, plus the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Partnership. In preparation for the briefing he undertook some background research on the situation in a majority of EU Member States and a selection of Third countries and states to ascertain whether there were models that might be of interest to the EU and its Member States.

Given the limited time and budget the research did not claim to be comprehensive. Nevertheless the study involved interviews or email correspondence with researchers or representatives of governments or national cultural institutes involved in cultural relations in 25 countries (14 in the EU), as well as desk research on more than 30 other countries in Europe, Asia, North and South America and Australasia. A selective literature survey was also undertaken to provide European Commission officials with a bibliography of relatively recent documentation.

The suggestion that a paradigm shift may have taken place had been put forward by Gjis de Vries, by some of the members of the European Union of National Cultural institutes (EUNIC) and, indeed, by the author of the research himself1.

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1 Rod Fisher noted some policy changes taking place in his research on co-operation in Europe involving National Cultural Institutes, which was incorporated into the Interarts/EFAH/CIRCLE study for the European Commission on Cultural Co-operation in Europe (2003) or see, for example, his article La co-operazione culturale in una Europa in transizione in “Economia della Culture”, XV, 2005, No.1, and his presentation Value Bringer or Tool for Damage Limitation? Culture in Foreign Policy: The National and European Dimension, International Conference on Cultural Promotion and Diplomacy, Dubrovnik, October 2005 published in “Diplomatic Academy Proceedings” Zagreb, Vol. 7, 2009, No1.
In examining whether a paradigm shift had taken place, the research sought to establish:

1) Whether cultural relations policy was still primarily based on traditional approaches to cultural diplomacy. ‘Traditional’ in this context was understood to be where the main focus is the pursuit of self-interest, which sought to present only positive images of a country and which was strongly driven by foreign policy ambitions;

2) Whether there was evidence that policy was more strategic;

3) If there was such evidence, whether the current approach to cultural relations was more ‘open’ with policies directed to cultural co-operation where there was mutual benefit to both visiting and host countries (and less driven by foreign policy agendas).

The research was complicated by loose definitions of the terminology, with terms such as cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, cultural co-operation, cultural exchange etc used interchangeably.

Co-incidentally, ICCE (the Institute for Creative and Cultural Entrepreneurship) at Goldsmiths College, University of London, organised a seminar in London in June 2009 on cultural diplomacy, with the support of the UNESCO Commission of the Slovak Republic, the European Network of Cultural Administration Training Centres (ENCATC), the International Theatre Institute (British Centre) and the Ratiu Foundation’s Romanian Cultural Centre. Interest was generated in the research for the European Commission and the findings were subsequently presented at seminars in Bratislava in February 2010 (with the support of the Slovak National Commission of UNESCO and University of Music and the Arts, Bratislava) and in Brussels in May 2010 (with the support of ENCATC). It was also agreed the research results would be disseminated in a new book in cultural diplomacy. However, as the date for publication was deferred (now expected Autumn 2011), the research author, Rod Fisher, was anxious to revisit the study, not least because there was anecdotal evidence that the global economic crisis was beginning to impact on cultural diplomacy budgets. Fortunately the European Cultural Foundation agreed to fund the updating of original research and this
report is the result of that examination. The focus of this document is on the changes that have occurred; it does not seek to present the original study, though key findings are summarised.

I am most grateful to Isabelle Schwarz and Tsveta Andreeva at the European Cultural Foundation for their interest and support, which has enabled the research undertaken in 2009 to be brought up to date. My thanks are also due to all those who took time to respond to the questions I posed in this updating exercise. They are listed in Annex 1. Basma el Husseiny and Culture Resource kindly compiled for me a database of cultural experts in the Middle East and North Africa who had contributed to the fascinating new publication on *Cultural Policies in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia: An Introduction* (European Cultural Foundation and Boekman Studies). While I was drafting this report, Sarah Gardner, CEO of the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies, kindly let me see in confidence a draft copy of an IFACCA Discussion Paper by Judith Staines on ‘Supporting international arts activity – issues for national arts funding agencies’. This indicated the increasingly important role played by arts councils and other governmental/quasi-governmental agencies in supporting international arts engagement and incidentally, there is no overlap between that study and my work. Finally, I am indebted to Dr. Carla Figueira who helped me with desk research and had the unenviable task of typing this report from my handwritten script.
Research Task, Methodology and Limitations

Between October 2010 and February 2011 research was undertaken to update the study conducted by the author in 2009 and previously referred to. For this new exercise 64 individuals (researchers and/or representatives of National Cultural Institutes or governmental officials) in 47 countries (27 EU and 20 in countries outside) were contacted by email and asked:

- Whether there have been new policy changes since summer 2009 and, if so, what the nature of those changes were;
- Whether there have been budgetary reductions to the cultural diplomacy/cultural relations programmes of their country recently, or whether cutbacks were foreseen.

In addition, contacts in countries that had not responded to the 2009 research were also asked:

- Whether they considered a paradigm shift was evident in the cultural diplomacy/cultural relations policies of their countries.

As in the original survey, it was considered important to also look at the situation and policies in a select number of third countries in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Partnership, the Mediterranean rim, Asia, Australia, and North and South America, not only to provide some global comparisons, but also to ascertain, wherever possible, the extent to which cultural relations with EU States were a priority for them. Some Middle Eastern countries were also on the list.

After some progress chasing, responses were received from 27 individuals in 20 countries (16 of them EU Member States). Telephone interviews were conducted with several of these. Not all of the countries who responded to the first survey did so this time. On the other hand, some new ones did. Desk research was conducted on a further 18 countries.

In common with the previous study, information was sought wherever possible from cultural researchers, in particular to ensure responses were not coloured
by “official” views of those directly involved in cultural diplomacy. In several instances, the researchers redirected the questions to representatives of ministries or personnel in national cultural institutes. As it happens, most of these respondents were open, and occasionally, very frank, with their answers. Moreover, as I knew some of the staff of the national cultural institutes professionally, I am confident their replies genuinely reflect the reality. Two respondents provided information “off the record” and asked not to be identified.

On the basis of the information received, it has been possible to compare the current situation in EU Member States and beyond with the results gathered in 2009, and this has resulted in modifications to some aspects of the original findings.
Definitional Problems

One of the difficulties encountered in the 2009 study was the confusion in terminology employed in this area. Terms such as cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, cultural co-operation and cultural exchange were often used interchangeably. Not only were definitions employed loosely by some states or their agencies in their policy papers, political pronouncements and websites, but the distinctions were not always fully appreciated by some in the cultural sector. The most common illustration of this was the use of cultural co-operation when cultural diplomacy was more accurate (and vice-versa) or cultural exchange when cultural co-operation would have been more appropriate. Does this matter? Well, yes it does if we are seeking accuracy in our policy analysis. This is not simply a question of semantics. Each of these terms have distinctive meanings (albeit the differences are sometimes subtle).

Conceptually public diplomacy has much in common with soft power the term coined by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye. As is implied, soft power is about winning hearts and minds through more subtle means than military and economic power. Public diplomacy is one of the keys of soft power. It has been described by Paul Sharp as:

“The process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interest and extend the values of those being represented”

The process of relationship building is also at the heart of this definition by Mark Leonard, but it is noticeable that the tone is a little less self-interested:

“Public diplomacy is about…understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misconceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause”

As can be seen, both of these definitions are concerned with influencing others, but they differ from traditional diplomacy in that they seek to target and engage with a broader audience, rather than the political elites or foreign peer groups that have customarily been the focus of diplomatic effort. Public

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diplomacy is about establishing trust and is increasingly recognised that it is a
domain in which NGOs, business and others can engage and not only
diplomats.

Cultural diplomacy is usually regarded as a dimension of public diplomacy. In
Joseph Nye’s words it is:

“a prime example of “soft power” or the ability to persuade through
culture values and ideas, as opposed to “hard power”, which conquers
or coerces”\(^4\)

Cultural diplomacy is not a new term; neither is it a neutral one. It carries with
it a lot of questionable baggage because of its association, historically, with
the pursuit of geo-political and trade advantages, or propaganda – especially
in the inter-War and Cold War years of the 20\(^{th}\) Century – or a mission
civilisatrice in the developing world. Yet it remains in common usage. Indeed,
in recent years it has become a fashionable area for academic study and
conference debate. Today, though, a contemporary understanding of the term
would probably be in line with the description of Milton Cummings Jnr:

“the exchange of ideas, information, art, lifestyles, value systems,
traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture among nations and their
peoples to foster mutual understanding.”\(^5\)

A number of national cultural institutes and some governments in EU states
prefer to use the term cultural relations in preference to cultural diplomacy.
Cultural relations refers to the use of culture as an instrument to foster
understanding and good relations between countries. Richard Arndt
distinguishes between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. Cultural
relations he suggests:

“grow naturally and organically without government intervention – the
transaction of trade and tourism, student flows, communications, book
circulation, migration, media access, intermarriage – (and) millions of
clearly cross-cultural encounters.”\(^6\)

On the other hand, he asserts that cultural diplomacy involves diplomats in
the service of governments who employ (cultural) exchanges to support

\(^4\) Joseph Nye, Soft Power, in Foreign Policy, No 80, Autumn 1990 or Soft Power: The Means
to Success in World Politics, New York, Perseus, 2004 [to be checked]

\(^5\) Milton C Cummings Jnr, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey
2003, Washington DC, Center for Arts and Culture, 2003

\(^6\) Richard Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth
Century, Washington DC, Potomac Books, 2005
national interests. This may be somewhat of a generalisation, but it does point up the slightly derogatory nature in which cultural diplomacy is sometimes represented today.

_Mutuality_ is a term often linked to cultural relations, especially by bodies such as the British Council. It refers to the building of sustainable relations that are mutually beneficial both to the host and foreign country.

_Cultural exchange_ is one aspect of cultural diplomacy. The keyword, ‘exchange’ implies reciprocity in the movement of cultural organisations and artists etc between countries whether formally (e.g. through bilateral cultural agreements) or informally. Although it remains in common usage, the term is less fashionable today than it was in the 20\(^{th}\) century. To a large extent it has been superceded by _international cultural co-operation_, though this term is about more than _cultural exchange_. It refers to collaboration and engagement across borders between cultural operators and/or organisations, whether or not supported by governments or their agencies.

Other terms which crop up in the context of cultural diplomacy are _cultural export_, _cultural branding_ and, occasionally, _smart power_.

_Cultural export_ has assumed increasing importance in recent years with the growing interest in finding international markets for the creative and cultural industries. Whether or not it is the prime responsibility of a trade ministry or culture ministry, it may feature as an objective of cultural diplomacy policy. The task of marketing a nation’s creative and cultural industries may fall to a trade official at an embassy or to cultural institutes (the latter may have a role in promoting their nation’s cultural organisations through showcasing their work to promoters and presenters from other countries). Sometimes this is referred to as _cultural promotion_ rather than _cultural export_, but the distinction is unclear as both are intended to find international market opportunities.

_Cultural (re)branding_ (or _nation branding_) is also related to marketing, but in this case it is about developing a recognizable image (or a new one in the
case of re-branding) for a country, a region or city through its culture. It is sometimes regarded as an objective of, adjunct to, or instrument for the public diplomacy or cultural diplomacy policies of governments or their agencies.

Finally, the term *smart power* was coined by Joseph Nye following the invasion of Iraq and refers to the application of both hard and soft power to achieve effective outcomes. It involves “the strategic use of diplomacy and persuasion, as well as the projection of influence and power in ways that are cost-efficient and have political and social legitimacy”\(^7\). Although its relevance to cultural diplomacy may not be immediately obvious, some illustrations of what is meant can be cited, including the British Council’s policy to “mend fences” and rebuild trust through such things as the provision of technical assistance for the National Museum of Baghdad and the supply of books for Iraq’s libraries.

There was a temptation in this report to use the term *traditional cultural diplomacy* to refer to the approaches states or their agencies have employed historically to promote abroad their countries’ culture, language and education, and the term *new cultural diplomacy* to signify a departure from the traditional application of policies and actions in this sphere of diplomatic effort in favour of policies based on mutual benefit. However, this was considered not entirely satisfactory, not least because some cultural institutes have been using the ‘new’ approach for some time. Consequently, to avoid confusion, this report will use the term ‘cultural relations’ throughout unless the context determines the need to refer specifically to ‘cultural diplomacy’ or one of the other terms.

Key Findings of the 2009 Study

The research revealed mixed messages about whether a paradigm shift had taken place, with clear policy shifts in some states or their agencies, often accompanied by more strategic approaches to international cultural relations. This was the case in Austria, Romania, Slovenia and, although not a new development, in Germany. There were indications that some countries tried to balance cultural diplomacy with more genuine and open cultural co-operation /cultural relations policies, as in Finland, the Netherlands and the UK. Policy shifts were being actively discussed in France and several other states signalled their intention to change their cultural diplomacy approaches. But their was little evidence of change in the remainder. Indeed in some instances, it was suggested that even having a cultural diplomacy policy and budget was seen as an advance on the present situation in some countries by facilitating more international cultural contact.

Cultural policy had become more strategically integrated into foreign policy objectives in some EU states. However, in some others there was evidence of conflicting agendas and territorial tensions between government departments, especially those concerned with foreign affairs and culture, but in some cases also trade.

This suggested the need for greater recognition of the convergence of policy interest between foreign affairs, culture, trade (especially in relation to marketing the creative and cultural industries) and development aid, which required the elaboration of transversal international policy strategies.

One of the factors usually cited as signifying a policy shift in cultural diplomacy is a move from bilateral to multilateral relations. However, there are a noticeable number of EU States still committed to developing bilateral cultural relations as well as multilateral ones.
Calls for the European Union to incorporate a stronger cultural dimension in its external relations had prompted some EU states to review their own international policies. Political change and/or budgetary pressures had also been a catalyst for such reviews.

It was only to be expected that cultural relations between EU states and Third countries tended to be dominated by France, Germany and the UK because of their extensive networks of cultural institutes globally. A relatively new player, China was likely to join the “big three” soon given the accelerated growth in the number of Confucious Institutes globally.

A broader foreign public and new stakeholders such as NGOs were being targeted in the international cultural relations policies of an increasing number of EU states, facilitated by new communications technology and the growth of social networking etc. However, not all of the diplomatic community have adjusted to these new realities. This suggests the need for capacity-building in some EU states for those involved in cultural diplomacy/cultural relations.

Museums, theatres, opera houses and other cultural organisations, especially larger ones, have developed their own networks for international collaboration, whether or not they were supported in these endeavours by governments or their agencies. Similarly, regions and cities continue to pursue visibility through international events and networking.

Most EU states prioritise China and India, but for some this is aspirational rather than realistic. Moreover, no matter how sophisticated policies were, it was evident that the ambitions of some EU states were not matched by resources.

Encouraged by EUNIC, co-operation between national cultural institutes was likely to increase in Third countries, whether justified on economic grounds or to demonstrate their ‘European’ credentials, or to have greater impact in particular countries. However, this was less likely in the BRIC countries...
(Brazil, Russia, India and China), because individual governments were keen to have a cultural and educational stake in potentially large new markets.

New budgetary realities in some states were likely to impact on cultural relations programmes.

There is certainly evidence that some EU states or their agencies had elaborated a more strategic approach to their external cultural relations. This did not always mean that the policies were less encumbered by foreign policy agendas, nor that traditional approaches to cultural diplomacy have been abandoned necessarily. Cultural diplomacy as traditionally practised may no longer be a dominant factor in international cultural relations, but it has not disappeared, simply changed its nature.

The research also made reference to the international cultural policies of selected Third countries, both in Europe and beyond, and the policies of Norway, Switzerland and Quebec were cited as interesting illustrations of the application of soft power.
Identification and Analysis of New Developments

New Policy Developments and Instruments

Evidence suggests that several EU Member States have adopted more strategic approaches to aspects of their cultural relations policies in the last two years. None of these within the EU could be described as seismic shifts in policy, but they are interesting developments nonetheless.

In 2009 the Culture Council was asked by the Dutch Parliament to reflect on the way the Netherlands is represented abroad by cultural institutions and embassy staff. Accordingly, the Council published its vision in Autumn 2010. The report suggests that arts/culture should be integrated into a broader scope of international policies, in this way contributing to the better positioning and greater visibility of the Netherlands globally. This interest in the nation’s image is in line with the greater emphasis in recent years on profiling Dutch culture abroad. The Council considered this shift could help stimulate the economy and international trade and attract more tourism. In its report the Council recommends that the Government Departments of Culture and of Foreign Affairs should work together more closely, not least to achieve greater policy coherence. Its recommendation that the Department of Culture should be more proactive in regulating and guiding international activities that receive government funding to prevent the presentation of events that are of questionable impact suggests a more ‘hands-on’ policy is being sought.

The issue of a lack of coherence in the different policy agendas or actions of foreign and cultural ministries is evident in other countries as well. Recent policy approaches to cultural relations and cultural co-operation in Sweden provide an illustration. On the one hand, the principles of international cultural co-operation in the Swedish Government Bill for Cultural Policy (Tid för Kultur) of September 2009 emphasises cultural integrity, long term perspectives and reciprocity. On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry, its embassies and agencies (chiefly the Swedish Institute) have moved from clear aims to
support cultural relations to a more instrumental view, which entails working with culture if and when it is the right tool for promoting Sweden’s international image. The significant changes in cultural relations in recent years stem from developments within the Foreign Ministry and its agencies. Prior to 2009, the Swedish International development Agency (SIDA) was Sweden’s largest funder of international cultural co-operation through its funding schemes and programmes. Since then, culture has been seen as part of general support for human rights and freedom of expression within developmental co-operation. In 2010 the Government substantially increased support for initiatives designed to promote the virtues of freedom of expression internationally. Paradoxically, cultural co-operation does not seem to have played much of a role in this as yet.

Questions about the connections or disconnections between cultural relations and foreign policy are an ongoing topic of debate in non EU Switzerland. New policy is likely to emerge as a result of the new Culture Promotion Act 2010.

A very specific policy shift has occurred in the Romanian Cultural Institute in Brussels. From 2011, it is adopting a strategy that is quite distinct from the rest of the RCI network. Profiling itself as an interface with the European institutions and a disseminator of good practice, the Institute in Brussels will also run a cultural management residencies programme not just for its own citizens, but for Moldavians, Serbians and Ukrainians as well.

There is a perception in the UK that the New Coalition Government is more interested in the way cultural relations can be an instrument for trade benefits, though at the time of this research this had yet to find its way into specific policy actions. A more tangible change in the UK is occurring in policy delivery mechanisms employed by the British Council, in as much as there is an examination of digital tools in the ‘mix’ (e.g. social networking and online showcasing of cultural organisations). The Cervantes institute is also very active in the use of digital tools in its cultural relations armoury, notably online streaming through Cervantes TV. This raises fundamental questions about the effectiveness of policy delivery instruments that is relevant to many other
countries. At the British Council there appears to be increased awareness that older instruments for policy delivery are often ‘slow burn’. Their impacts may only be felt after a number of years. On the other hand, the ‘payback’ in the use of digital tools tends to be more immediate (at least at a surface level), but it is harder to see the long term effects.

Other policy shifts in cultural relations may also become evident in due course as a result of policy reviews which are underway (e.g. in the Slovak Republic), or as a consequence of the economic climate referred to later in this report.

The most significant policy developments recorded by the research in some Third countries have taken place in South Korea and the USA. The former plans to establish 150 King Sejong Institutes to promote Korean language and cultural exchange by 2015. Currently most of the KSI are located in the USA and Japan, but a substantial presence in South East Asia is envisaged (perhaps to capitalise on the Korean ‘New Wave’ phenomenon in pop culture, film and TV in Asia). More visibility in Europe is also expected. South Korea is ambitious to brand itself as a global cultural player, with Seoul and Gwangju as cultural hubs.

Of course, China is leading the way in terms of the recent expansion of its global cultural and linguistic presence. The network of Confucious Institutes and China Cultural Centres continues to expand and the country is well on its way to reaching its target of 1,000 institutes by 2020.

After considerable expectation and subsequent disappointment about the Obama Administration’s relative lack of action, as opposed to rhetoric, on the importance of cultural diplomacy, we are now beginning to see new programme initiatives and a shift in the policy focus. There have been a few false dawns on the way, most notably the report Moving Forward: A Renewed Role for American Arts and Artists in the Global Age of December 2009, which recommended “that international arts and cultural exchanges be integrated into the planning strategies of US policy makers as a key element.
of public diplomacy. The report, signed by a leading group of US policy makers, academics and directors of major cultural institutions, made detailed recommendations to build deeper and broader cultural exchanges, establish a credible evidence base for policy, utilise new technologies for cultural co-operation, promote public/private partnerships and expand federal programmes etc. In particular it called for leadership at the highest level. However, the report did not appear to make much headway politically.

But there is recent evidence of a shift from a concert based approach of sending American cultural performers to tour overseas, to a policy focus on cultural interaction concentrating on community engagement and outreach. One illustration of this is ‘smARTpower’, an initiative to send 15 visual artists abroad to create community-based projects that are intended to stimulate dialogue on themes such as the environment, education, freedom of expression, health and women’s issues. Another new programme that illustrates a policy change is ‘Center Stage’, which will bring 10 international performing arts groups from Pakistan, Indonesia and Haiti to the US for a month in 2012. This represents a departure from the traditional emphasis on presenting American performers overseas.

Not that such programmes have been abandoned. The ‘Rhythm Road: American Music Abroad’ programme has been operating for five years and has sent music groups to more than 100 countries to perform jazz, blues, gospel, rock music and hip-hop etc, and builds on a long tradition of presenting American jazz etc abroad. In addition, ‘DanceMotion USA’, now in its second season is sending four US contemporary dance companies to a diverse range of countries (China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mozambique and the

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8 John Brademas Center for the Study of Congress, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University, Moving Forward: A Renewed Role for American Arts and Artists in the Global Age, A Report to the President and the Congress of the USA, December 2009
9 See address by Ann Stock, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, to the Annual Conference of the Association of Performing Arts Presenters, New York, 7 January 2011, http://exchanges.state.gov/about/assistant-secretary-stock/01072011_apap.html
Palestinian territories). The concerns now are that the expansion of US action in cultural relations isn’t brought to a premature end by political disagreements over the US budget.

**Organizational Change**

Organizational change in the public sector may be driven by a range of objectives, such as the desire to achieve greater coherence in policy delivery, improving efficiency and reducing costs. All these factors seem to have been behind the creation of the Institut Français in 2010. This new body groups together several agencies: CulturesFrance (which in turn replaced l’Association Française d’Action Artistique in 2006), the c1000 branches of the Alliance Française; the network of centre culturels and French Institutes globally. It also has new competencies, eg attracting foreign students from around the world, but with no additional budget. Although the Institut Français will be responsible for a global network of cultural institutes, it will not be present everywhere (where there are joint bodies established with the host country, as in Addis-Abeba, Ethiopia, they will remain). Arguably, the change primarily represents a structural rather than strategic reform.

Cultural diplomacy in Hungary has traditionally been the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture. However, the function has now been removed from the Ministry and split into two: the Foreign Ministry has taken the responsibility for the Balassi Institute (created in 2002 by the Ministry of Education for the preservation and dissemination of Hungarian culture in general and language in particular); and the Ministry of the Interior has become responsible for nation branding and for Hungarofest (the organisation in charge of major seasons and events, which has been a central feature of Hungarian cultural diplomacy and co-operation in recent years).

Another development since the earlier study concerns the teaching of the Portuguese language overseas at primary and secondary levels, which since 2010 has become the responsibility of the Instituto Camões, a body funded by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previously, the Instituto Camões was responsible for language tuition at higher education levels, while teaching at lower levels overseas was the task of the Ministry of Education. In addition, the Instituto Camões announced a number of developments for 2011 including a review of the presentation of cultural programmes and expenditure and the creation of a resources centre for researchers interested in external cultural policy. In 2010 an inter-ministerial agreement was reached between Portuguese ministries responsible for Foreign Affairs and for the Economy in relation to international policy and if, as anticipated, it is extended to the Ministry of Culture, international action could become more strategic rather than compartmentalised as it has been historically. Meetings of an Inter-ministerial Commission for the Internationalization of the Portuguese Language which were also instituted, may prove to be an encouraging start.

Finally, the Foreign Ministry has been reorganised in Italy, as a result of which cultural co-operation appears to have been ‘downgraded’. A new division has been established for Italian culture abroad and another one for promoting business (including the creative industries) internationally.

**Budgetary Reductions**

Given the economic climate in Europe and beyond, it was only to be expected that there would be reductions to budgets for international cultural relations. This was foreseen in the original study, but the recent research has revealed the extent of the budgetary cuts made in the last couple of years.

In early 2009 severe public expenditure cutbacks were announced in the Czech Republic during its presidency of the EU. These amounted to reductions in Ministry of Culture programmes of 35%-50% of 2008 levels. Following a vote of no confidence in the Government in April 2009, an interim administration was installed and a new Minister of Culture – Prof. Václav Riedlbaüch, a former Director of the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra – was
able to restore some of the funding in the second half of the year. However, there were further reductions in 2010, including once again for international cultural co-operation, resulting in budgets at pre 2008 levels. Also in 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seriously reduced its budget for embassy operation and its funding for the 22 Czech Centres, whose mission is to build a dialogue through culture, education, tourism and business, with the foreign publics in the countries in which they are located. The Foreign Affairs Ministry is experiencing further budget reductions in 2011. As a consequence, embassies in five countries (Costa Rica, Kenya, Venezuela, Yemen and the Congo) and consulates in Mumbai and Sydney are being closed. Activities of the Czech Centres are being reduced and there is relatively little funds available for international cultural cooperation. There is a freeze on staff recruitment and replacement and the Czech Centre in Buenos Aires is expected to close. Moreover, cuts of 10% or more in the budgets of cultural organisations funded by the Ministry of Culture is expected to lead to a decline in the international activities of these organisations.

Italy has been in the process of making considerable reductions in central government expenditure and the cultural sector has not been immune from this. Funding for the Italian Institute is down from Euro 18.42 million in 2007 to Euro 13.40 million in 2011 (i.e. 27.22%). The budget for supporting Italian artistic events abroad is also down from Euro 3.06 million in 2007 to Euro 1.28 million in 2011 (a decrease of 58.20%). Reductions in the budget for the dissemination of the Italian language have been even greater - from Euro 10.29 million in 2007 to Euro 4.06 million in 2011, representing a decline of 60.51%.

France has experienced cutbacks of 30% in its cultural diplomacy budget since 2008. The effect has been primarily one of reductions in personnel employed in its cultural institutes and cultural attachés etc in its embassies. There is also a freeze on recruitment when staff leave or retire.

The financial crisis in Greece has seriously affected the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, whose budget was cut by 50% in 2011 (from Euro 2.5 million to
Euro 1.25 million). Financial problems have led to the closure of its representation in Paris and New York and reductions in staff. However, the HFC is keen to maintain its presence in the Balkans, Russia (Moscow) and Egypt (Alexandria), as well as offices in Berlin, London, Vienna and now Brussels. Although the Foundation’s budget for 2011 was increased moderately, by Euro 266,000, further cuts may be made before the end of the year. Certainly the restoration of its funds to 2009 levels is not foreseen in the short term given the Greek Government’s austerity programme.

In 2009 there had been a dramatic fall in public financing of culture in Latvia, but since the new research, there have been further serious cuts, resulting in a reduction to 43% of the 2008 budget. The financial situation led to the closure of the Latvian Institute. Another of the Baltic States, Estonia, has also been experiencing cuts across government departments, Foundation Tallinn 2011 responsible, as the name suggests, for the programme for Tallinn’s year as European Capital of Culture, had its modest grant for the event cut substantially from Euro 0.6 million to Euro 0.23 million, impacting on its international programme. Some cultural institutes from other EU states are endeavouring to support aspects of the programme.

Both the Foreign Affairs and Culture Ministries in Portugal have suffered reduction in their budgets for international cultural action in 2011. There is pressure on the Instituto Camões to generate significantly more of its financial resources through language tuition in future.

Although budgets of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Culture in Romania have been reduced, the good news is that the Romanian Cultural Institute programme budget for 2011 was the highest ever. However, there has been a freeze on positions in Romanian public administration (as well as reductions in salaries of 25%), and the Institute has been unable to replace personnel who leave.

Slovenia was one of the EU States identified in the original research as having had a paradigm shift in its cultural diplomacy policy. This was
particularly evident when Slovenia had the presidency of the EU during 2008 and there was an increased budget for culture and cultural relations. However, the following year there was a big drop in the government funding for culture and substantial reductions in the foreign affairs budget since then. This has had an impact on embassy staffing levels and international cultural relations (e.g. the Euro 50,000 contribution of the Foreign Affairs Ministry towards the Balkan Incentive Fund for Culture – an initiative of the European Cultural Foundation and Soros (OSI) to stimulate cultural co-operation between Balkan countries – has been withdrawn for 2011). Although support for another Balkan initiative, the Sarajevo Notebooks project, is expected to continue, concerns have been registered that the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s support for cultural relations will be largely confined to promotion of ‘national’ culture linked to high level political visits.

There were drastic cuts in Spain to the budget for international cultural co-operation in 2010. In Autumn of that year press announcements suggested the Government would cut Euro 600 million from the 2011 budget for international co-operation overall. According to the Directorate for Cultural and Scientific Relations of the Spanish Agency for International Co-operation for Development (an autonomous agency linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), its budget for 2011 will be severely reduced. Meanwhile, in Catalunya, where the Regional Government has been in severe financial difficulties, the Directorate General for the Promotion of the Internationalization of Catalan Organizations has been abolished to save money.

In Sweden, where both the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have budgets for cultural co-operation, the former’s budget is largely intact, but the budget for cultural co-operation of the latter has experienced substantial reductions.

With a new Coalition Government in the UK committed to rapidly reducing the nation’s large deficit, major cutbacks in expenditure in nearly all spending departments are underway. The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) has
passed on major reductions to the British Council, which it part funds, and this is primarily impacting on staff numbers at the Council’s global network of offices. At this stage, the arts component of the British Council’s operations – which is small compared with the Council’s work in English language tuition and education – has been largely protected\(^\text{10}\). Income generation through the British Council’s language and education work has been growing, and will be required to grow further as the proportion of government funding decreases as a percentage of the Council’s budget over the next four years of so. Another major instrument of cultural diplomacy, the BBC World Service, has had its grant from the FCO reduced. This has resulted in cutbacks to the BBC’s international reach (e.g. services in Russian, Serbo-Croat, Portuguese for Africa etc have stopped). Further cuts are expected in the run up to 2014, when the BBC will be required to take over funding responsibility of the World Service from the FCO, especially as the BBC is constrained by Government from increasing its revenue from the annual licence fee it charges to listeners and viewers.

In 2009 when the original study was undertaken, the German Government provided Euros 1,436 million for foreign engagement through cultural, language and educational activities (equivalent to 0.47% of the national budget). The budget for 2010 grew to Euros 1,513 million, largely due to increases for education and language work, but there were some modest reductions during the year because of the economic crisis. Further reductions of 3% are being made to the cultural relations budget in 2011, but unlike the situation facing cultural institutes in some other EU States, the impact on the Goethe Institut is likely to be relatively modest.

Although there have been budgetary reductions for culture in Hungary, its assumption of the presidency of the EU in 2011 has broadly protected the

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\(^\text{10}\) In 2008 the *British Council Arts Strategy: Connecting the UK with the World through Culture* and the subsequent British Council *Action Plan for the Arts* the same year indicated the Council intended to restore its spending on the arts to some £30 million per year (i.e. to 2006/07 levels) for three years. But whether the protection of the arts component of the Council’s budget is an acknowledgement of that commitment is unclear.
cultural relations budget, at least for the duration of the presidency. However, there are fears of reductions later.

Concerns about the future have been expressed also in the Netherlands: Although the 2011 budget for cultural relations was broadly in line with the previous year, a new Cabinet has indicated its intention of redesigning Dutch international policy, focussing on economic and trade interests and reducing public expenditure, including culture, by up to 20% by 2015.

Surprisingly, given its current economic plight, Ireland was one EU country where there have not been reductions to cultural relations budgets. Indeed, the budget for Culture Ireland has increased by 71%. However, the reason for this hike is an earmarked one-off Euro 3 million to fund Culture Ireland's major season of contemporary Irish Culture – “Imagine Ireland” – in the USA in 2011. If this is excluded, the Culture Ireland budget is Euro 3.99 million compared with Euro 4.08 million in 2010 – a reduction of 2%.

Although it was not possible to obtain responses on cultural relations budgets in all EU Members States, it is evident that the general picture is one of budgetary reductions and/or service cutbacks for international cultural engagement. There is also evidence of cutbacks in the cultural relations budgets of countries outside the EU (Serbia and Switzerland are just two examples). True, there are some notable exceptions to this trend. Ireland has been mentioned and Austria and Denmark are countries where there have only been small adjustments to the cultural relations budget. However, even in the latter, there is concern that the growing political gap between the right and left of centre parties, instead of the policy consensus that used to prevail in the country, may lead to political meltdown, with absolute priority being given by the left and centre-left to preserving the welfare state. In such a scenario, cultural relations will certainly not be a priority.

Inevitably, where there are reductions to resources, whether financial and/or human, this is likely to have an impact on the ability of governments/and agencies to deliver their cultural relations ambitions.
Growth and Consolidation of EUNIC

Another finding as a result of updating the research has been the rapid expansion of the European Union Network of Institutes of Culture (EUNIC), which in February 2011 had a membership of 29 institutes from 25 nations and clusters or EUNIC ‘hubs’ in more than 65 countries globally.

The creation of EUNIC in 2006 made considerable sense in the context of an enlarged European Union and the changes to geo-political and global economic power. Co-operation between the foreign cultural institutes of EU States is not new, but the establishment of an organisational framework to formalise that collaboration has facilitated such engagement.

EUNIC aims to provide advocacy for the benefit of international cultural relations, offer advice on international cultural policies, lobby the European institutions and national governments, share best practice and collaborate on tenders for EU programme funds. 2011 will be a turning point for EUNIC, with the assumption of its presidency by the President of the Instituto Camões, Portugal. EUNIC will have a permanent office and small staff in Brussels, which could strengthen its lobbying efforts. It will also become a collective financial responsibility of its members instead of the Goethe Institut and British Council, who have shouldered much of the funding burden so far.

It has to be said that EUNIC is not without its critics. Some representatives of smaller nations have suggested in both pieces of research that EUNIC is too dominated by the British, French and German members, which not only represent the largest EU States, but are also the ones with the most extensive global networks of cultural institutes, This may be inevitable given the greater resource allocations of those countries – though it is interesting to note that this has not prevented smaller nations such as Denmark and Romania (which currently holds the EUNIC presidency) enjoying important roles in EUNIC. Another reality, of course, is that even though the institutes work collaboratively to provide a European ‘front’ wherever possible, the primary
task of almost all of them remains the promotion of interest and engagement in the cultures and languages of their own nations.

In its defence, EUNIC claims that for smaller countries it provides a wider geographical presence than would otherwise be possible, more opportunity to access new funds, the benefits of networking and pooling resources and therefore, potentially more impact and visibility. This is important in the context of the aspirations of some smaller EU States, which are frequently not matched by adequate resources from their domestic governments.

One further new development in the context of EUNIC is the key role it envisages for itself in contributing to the delivery of the EU’s European External Action Service as it is rolled out globally.

**European External Action Service**

Since the initial study was undertaken, the EU has appointed a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Baroness Ashton). By the end of 2011, presuming an accord can be reached between the European Parliament, the Commission and Council of Ministers, the EU should have appointed around 3,700 personnel to administer its external relations policy in almost 130 delegations globally. The new delegations will have a much stronger political and diplomatic role than the Commission’s external offices have had until now.

Hitherto, the modest cultural intervention by European delegations has been adhoc, disjointed and lacking focus. Strategic objectives appear to have been completely absent. European theatre festivals, film festivals and similar events that are presented suffer from being insufficiently rooted in local need and lacking real engagement with local actors, NGOs and networks. Marketing is sometimes weak and post-event evaluation is uncommon. Commission delegation presentations are frequently dependant on the co-operation and
financial input of National Cultural Institutes, who are often unconvinced that this represents a good use of their time and money. Past research completed for the European Cultural Foundation/Lab for Culture has identified these problems, but also indicated a greater consensus among Member States to support EU action in this area to complement their own cultural relations efforts\textsuperscript{11}.

Now, as the European External Action Service (EEAS) process is rolling out EU delegations across the world, there is an opportunity to address past weaknesses in presenting ‘European’ culture. But what is disappointing is that the draft organizational chart for the EU’s representative offices abroad does not indicate any staff positions relating to culture. This is surprising given the 2007 Communication on an Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World identified, as one of its three policy pillars, the promotion of culture as a vital element in the EU’s international relations\textsuperscript{12}.

A Draft Report on the Cultural Dimension of the EU’s External Actions by the European Parliament (29 November 2010) has registered similar concerns about the apparent absence of culture as an instrument of EU diplomacy\textsuperscript{13}. The report, from rapporter Marietje Schaake, emphasises “the importance of cultural diplomacy in advancing the EU’s interest and values” and “calls for the designation of one person in each EU representation overseas (to be) responsible for the co-ordination of cultural relations and interactions between the EU and third countries”. It calls for the EEAS to concentrate on “the coordination and strategic development of cultural aspects, incorporating culture consistently and systematically into the EU’s external relations”.

Schaake’s report encourages the External Action Service to co-operate with networks such as EUNIC, and it is known that Commission officials are

\textsuperscript{11} Rod Fisher (ed), A Cultural Dimension to the EU’s External Policies – from Policy Statements to Practice and Potential, Amsterdam, Boekmanstudies, 2007

\textsuperscript{12} European Commission, Communication on an Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World, Brussels, COM (2007) 270

\textsuperscript{13} European Parliament, Draft report on the cultural dimension of the EU’s external actions, Committee Culture and Education, Marietje Schaake (rapporteur), Brussels, 29/11/10, 2010/2161 (INI).
generally supportive of the idea of EUNIC playing a role in the delivery of the EU’s external cultural relations. The report argues that the EU’s relations with third countries are best served through co-operation and partnerships and, recognising the cross-cutting nature of culture, it calls for its integration into the broad range of the EU’s external policy interests, from trade relations to the enlargement and neighbourhood policy, and from development assistance to foreign and security policy.

Adjustments to Geographical Priorities

There have been some adjustments to the stated geographical priorities for a number of EU States since the research of 2009. Austrian cultural relations is giving an additional focus to the Danube and Black Sea region. Germany is concentrating even more in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries, which seem to feature collectively or in part, in the priorities of many EU States. The UK has added Mexico and Turkey to its list of country priorities. Bulgaria has added Azerbaijan to its list. In the context of budgetary pressures only Moldova (which shares a common language and folklore) remains a priority country for Romania and a new Romanian Cultural Institute was inaugurated there in September 2010. The network of Romanian Cultural Institutes were encouraged to include Moldovan artists and cultural managers in their programmes. Government interest was strongly related to a hope that the pro-European coalition government in Moldova would be strengthened at the election of November 2010 (in the event it wasn’t!).

In the main, there is relatively little evidence of any significant new commitment on the part of EU States to prioritise cultural relations with countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood Partnership. Those EU Members that demonstrated a commitment to cultural engagement in this region at the time of the first study, e.g. Austria, Bulgaria, and Greece, continue to do so and, of course, the ‘big three’ (UK, France and Germany) are all involved in projects in the region. However, it is the BRIC countries and increasingly the Middle
East, Turkey and Moslem nations such as Indonesia that are identified as politically important in terms of cultural relations. South Africa and Mexico are also increasingly cited as priority countries.

Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Poland and Portugal are among the EU states to show continuing commitment to the countries of their diaspora. The usual justification is that these communities can be useful gate openers in their adopted country for the culture of their family origins. Maintaining these connections is understandable, but it could be argued that resources would be more productively devoted to reaching new audiences rather than expatriates.

There is still a tendency in some EU States to identify a long list of Third countries they claim to be priorities. This is illustrated well by the geographical priorities of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Instituto Camões: the Community of Lusophone/Portuguese language countries; Latin America; Sub-Saharan Africa; North America; Asia and Australia; Russia; Switzerland, Ukraine and Moldova (plus the EU States). With such a long list it is questionable whether they can all be priorities.

**Policy Disconnect**

This research has already alluded to the difficulties in achieving policy coherence in cultural relations when government ministries – chiefly those responsible for foreign affairs and culture, but also trade and overseas development aid – have different policy objectives when they utilise culture and fail to reconcile these through systematic contact or, worse, give the impression of competing for territory. This can lead to a policy disconnect when the policies and actions of one ministry conflict with, or are undermined by, the policy of another.

One illustration of this revealed more starkly since the original research was undertaken, relates to the issues of visas to work or study in the UK. Changes
introduced to immigration rules has caused some problems for visiting artists from Third countries since the implementation in 2008 of a Points Based System (PBS) in the allocation of visas. Although the Government originally agreed that creative workers coming to the UK for less than three months would not require visas (though they still require a sponsor), the requirement for biometric information (including finger printing) for those intending to stay longer has meant that the processing is taking much longer than before. Moreover, there are indications that the three months rule was not being uniformly applied (a celebrated film director from Iran had his visa application refused to attend a film festival in the UK, as did a Chinese artist invited to attend the opening of his exhibition in London). UK cultural organisations, festivals and venues have been claiming that the new system has made it more difficult and costlier for Third country artists, writers, performers etc to come to the UK and led to cancelled or disrupted events and programmes when visa requests have been refused. In a recent survey conducted by the Greater London Authority, 42% of the groups questioned said they would work with fewer Third country artists in future. There are concerns that this is threatening the UK’s international standing in general and the position of London in particular as a major cultural and tourist destination.

Moreover, concerns have been voiced about the Government’s imposition of a ceiling on the numbers of visas awarded annually (probably including those for students from Third countries), with some suggesting it will undermine the work of the British Council and UK universities in promoting the benefits of UK higher education.
Conclusions

This research has sought to update the findings of a study conducted in 2009 on whether there was a paradigm shift in EU Member States’ cultural relations with Third countries. The author was concerned that developments may have occurred in the intervening period that could affect or even invalidate some of the conclusions of the original study, in particular the budgetary reductions for which there had been some early evidence two years ago. He wanted to assess any new policy shifts and also ascertain the policy situation in some EU States that had not responded to the original investigation.

This new analysis has proved valuable in indicating where policy changes have occurred and revealing the extent of the impact of the economic crisis on the cultural relations budgets of EU countries. It has also led the author to modify some of his original conclusions before they are published in a new book on cultural diplomacy later this year.

There was an implied assumption in the brief presented to the author for the information briefing he was asked to give to European Commission staff in Brussels in 2009, that the traditional approaches to cultural diplomacy were no longer appropriate and were being replaced in some EU States by new, more strategic policies of international cultural co-operation. This raises some questions. First, does being strategic necessarily imply a policy is any less tied to foreign policy objectives? Secondly, does international cultural co-operation itself imply greater openness and more relevance to today’s world than traditional cultural diplomacy? The problem in answering both questions is that once again the research revealed confusion associated with the terminology employed in cultural relations. The term ‘cultural diplomacy’ is increasingly avoided by some of the national cultural institutes, who much prefer the term ‘cultural relations’. On the other hand, there are EU States that have no such problems in using the term ‘cultural diplomacy’. In some Third countries, such as the USA, the term is positively embraced by politicians, academics and often by the cultural community itself (who simply regard it as
a framework within which it can be financially supported to engage internationally – notwithstanding the loaded baggage the term brings with it as a result of Cold War politics). Therefore any contemporary analysis of international cultural relations has to acknowledge that difficulties associated with the terminology are not easy resolvable and the best that can be done is to uncover the sense in which the terms are used whenever possible.

Focussing now on the key conclusions of this new research exercise, it is evident that the most noticeable changes have been the budgetary reductions to cultural relations programmes, staffing and sometimes institutes. Of the EC States where information was provided or obtained by desk research, 13 indicated financial cutbacks of some kind, in some cases rather drastic. Of the remainder one was forecasting reductions. Only Austria, Denmark, Hungary and, rather unexpectedly, Ireland had not experienced cuts in planned expenditure in 2011. In the case of Hungary, the budget may have been protected because of its EU Presidency role, while Ireland's budgetary support was inflated by its support for a large one-off project in the USA. Moreover, among the non-respondents there are several where cutbacks appear to have been made, e.g. Lithuania.

Obviously these reductions are impacting on the ability of some EU States to meet their cultural relations objectives and are requiring them to lower their ambitions. There are also expectations that sustained budgetary difficulties will generate political pressure to demonstrate that priority is given to those initiatives with Third countries where there are the most obvious benefits to the “providing” country, i.e. more emphasis on self-interest than on mutual benefit.

Policy changes in EU States were most evident in the Netherlands and Sweden. The need for greater policy coherence between ministries involved in international relations was evident in both countries. Interestingly, both give the impression, though in different ways, that cultural relations is being tied more closely to foreign policy or development agendas. Among Third countries, policy shifts were most evident in South Korea, which appears to be
maintaining its international cultural ambitions, and in the USA, where there seems to be some impetus at last in developing its cultural relations programmes and, interestingly, initiatives with a more community based focus.

In addition, the increased use of digital tools for cultural relations objectives by the British Council and the Cervantes Institute, for example, raises interesting questions on whether priority should go to projects utilising new modes of communication and interaction that seem to have a more immediate impact (but where sustainability is uncertain), or to ‘slow burn’ initiatives that may deliver greater impacts in the long term.

Organizational changes were most evident in France with the creation of the new Institute Français, Hungary, Portugal and Italy.

The new research refers to the rapid expansion in the past two years of EUNIC and its cultural hubs across the world, which are facilitating co-operation between national cultural institutes, if not signalling the end of network ‘competition’. The British Council, Goethe Institut and French Institute with their extensive networks in and beyond the EU continue to dominate the field, which appears to worry some smaller nations, but not others who welcome the opportunity to have some visibility in places where they would not otherwise have a presence.

EUNIC is expected to have a role of some kind in the delivery of cultural actions when the European External Action Service completes the roll out of its delegations around the world. Strengthened EU delegations should provide an opportunity to address past weaknesses in the presentation of “European” culture globally. Surprisingly, however, cultural responsibilities appear to be absent from the personnel functions in the initial staffing proposals, as noted in November 2010 by the European Parliament in its Draft Report on the Cultural Dimension of the EU’s External Actions.
Geographical priorities of many EU States have remained broadly the same, with a continuing focus on the BRIC countries, and increasingly the Middle East, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa and Mexico. Some countries have been forced to trim their list of country priorities because of budgetary pressures. Based on new cultural initiatives and the resources committed to them, cultural relations with European Neighbourhood Partnership countries remain a priority for a relatively small number of EU States. At the same time, there is a continuing commitment by several EU Member States to their diaspora in Third countries.

A lack of ‘joined up’ government is evident in several countries between those ministries involved in international relations, directly or indirectly. This is most starkly revealed by the impact for the UK of new visa rules and restrictions imposed on Third country cultural practitioners, academics and other non EU nationals.

Finally, this new research has enabled the author to reconsider his original assessment of where paradigm shifts in cultural relations policies had really occurred. Budgetary cutbacks may have undermined the arguments that such a policy shift had taken place in Slovenia. On the other hand, the author was possibly a little unfair in his original research to his fellow compatriots at the British Council, whose staff continue to display independence of action and implement imaginative cultural relations initiatives, despite working within a policy framework articulated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Council’s approach certainly has been more strategic in recent years.
Annex 1 - List of New Survey Respondents

(Please note that two respondents are not listed as they provided information “off the record” and preferred not to be identified)

**Australia**: Karilyn Brown (General Manager, International Federation of Arts Councils and Cultural Agencies, Sydney; formerly with the Australia Council).

**Austria**: Andreas Pawlitschek (Head of Division for Public Cultural Relations, Directorate-General for Cultural Policy); Andreas Stadler (Director, Austrian Cultural Forum, New York).

**Czech Republic**: Pavla Petrova (Director, Arts & Theatre Institute, Prague)

**Denmark**: Uffe Andreasen (Author of *Diplomacy or Globalisation. An Introduction to Public Diplomacy*); Klaus Bondam (Director, Danish Cultural Institute, Brussels).

**Finland**: Timo Heino (Director, Unit for Public Diplomacy, Foreign Ministry, Helsinki).

**Germany**: Sabine Hentzsch (Director, Goethe Institut, London).

**Greece**: Costas Dallas (Assistant Professor, Communication, Media and Culture Department, Panteoin University, Athens and Associate Professor, Faculty of Information, University of Toronto); Vicky Barboka (Schuman Scholar, European Parliament office, London and MA Cultural Policy, City University, London – thesis on cultural diplomacy in a European context with reference to the Hellenic Foundation for Culture).

**Hungary**: Peter Inkei (Director, Budapest Observatory).

**Italy**: Carla Bodo (Cultural economist and researcher, Rome).
Netherlands: Cas Smithuijsen (Director, Boekman Foundation, Amsterdam).

Portugal: Jorge Manuel Barreto Xavier (Cultural consultant and former chef de cabinet to the Minister of Culture).

Romania: Marilena Stanciu (Director of Performance Assessment, Romanian Cultural Institutes abroad, Bucharest); Ovidiu Miron (Ph.D. student on cultural policy and a common EU external programme through EUNIC and former Director of Performance Assessment, RCI); Corina Suteu (Director, Romanian Cultural Institute, New York, and chair EUNIC hub, New York).

Serbia: Milena Dragicevic Sesic (Professor of Cultural Management, Faculty of Dramatic Arts, Belgrade, and UNESCO chair in Interculturalism and Mediation in the Balkans, University of Arts, Belgrade).

Slovenia: Vesna Copic (Legal and cultural consultant and adviser to the Ministry of Culture, Ljubljana).

Spain: Mercedes Giovinazzo (Director, Interarts, Barcelona).

Sweden: Hans Enflo (Deputy Director, Ministry of Culture, Stockholm); Ellen Wetmark (Head of International Affairs, Swedish Arts Council).

Switzerland: Petra Bischof (ProHelvetia, Zurich).

Tunisia: Ouafa Belgacem (Researcher in cultural policies, Tunis).

United Kingdom: Rebecca Walton (Head of Arts, British Council, London).

IFACCA (International Federation of Arts Councils and Cultural Agencies): Sarah Gardner, Chief Executive.
In addition, in the absence of responses, desk research was conducted on the following countries: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Egypt, Estonia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Morocco, Poland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Singapore and USA.

The following individuals also provided helpful guidance: John Foote (Cultural researcher, formerly Head of Research at the Canada Council), Tania Chomiak-Salvi (US Embassy, Brussels).
Annex 2 – Select Bibliography of Texts since 2009


Annex 3 - Profiles of the Researchers

Rod Fisher (www.rodfisher.org) is Director of International Intelligence on Culture. Before establishing this research consultancy in 1994, Rod worked for the Arts Council of Great Britain, latterly as International Affairs Manager, and prior to this he managed arts and leisure programmes in various London local authorities. He is a Visiting Lecturer on European Cultural Policies at Goldsmiths College, University of London, and is Honorary Research Fellow, City University, London, where he led a module from 1984-2007 on Cultural Policies in Europe and International Cultural Co-operation. He was director of the European Cultural Foundation UK Committee from 2002 – 2011.

Rod co-founded the CIRCLE research network (Chairman 1985-94) and chaired the European Task Force which produced In from the Margins, a report for the Council of Europe on the state of culture and development in Europe (1996). Rod has conducted research, lectured and/or delivered conference papers in 28 countries worldwide and has written extensively on the European institutions, cultural management training, comparative cultural policies etc. He has particular knowledge of the cultures and cultural policies of Europe and Asia.

His research interests include international cultural co-operation and cultural diplomacy, e.g. advising the Hong Kong Arts Development Council on an international cultural strategy (1997), contributing chapters on the work of national cultural institutes, language co-operation and research collaboration for the Interarts/EFAH study on The State of Cultural Co-operation in Europe (EC, 2003), and research for the ERICarts study Mobility Matters: Programmes and Schemes to Support the Mobility of Artists and Cultural Professionals (EC 2008). He co-edited Training in Transnational Cultural Co-operation Projects – Reflections and Challenges on Validation and Certification with Dr. E. Karpodini-Dimitriad (Fondation Marcel Hicter, Brussels 2007). The ECF/Lab for Culture commissioned him to examine whether preconditions exist in Member States for the elaboration of A Cultural Dimension to the EU’s External Policies (Boekmanstudies 2007). His research on whether there has been a paradigm shift in EU Member States’ cultural relations policies with ‘third’ countries will be published in 2011 as part of a new book on cultural diplomacy and, in the meantime, he has outlined initial findings at seminars in Barcelona, Bratislava, Brussels and New York.

Carla Figueira is a cultural researcher and consultant with interests in international relations, culture and language policies, operating in Portuguese, English, French, Spanish and Italian.

Presently based in the UK, she is originally from Portugal, where she graduated in International Relations, with specialisation in political and cultural relations. She also holds a Master of Arts in Arts Policy and Management (Chevening Scholar) and a PhD in Cultural Policy and Management (Praxis XXI Scholar), both from City University (London).
In her PhD thesis, *Languages at War in Lusophone Africa: External Language Spread Policies in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau at the turn of the 21st Century*, she examines the development of international language policies in Africa by the UK, France, Germany, Brazil and Portugal. The work is available through the British Library (http://ethos.bl.uk/Home.do) and its publication as a book is been prepared.

Current clients of Dr. Carla Figueira include the Institute of Creative and Cultural Entrepreneurship, Goldsmiths College, University of London, the private consultancy International Intelligence on Culture, and the charity European Cultural Foundation UK Committee. In her previous career, she was a senior manager of cultural public services at the Municipality of Lisbon, Portugal.

Public online profile available at http://uk.linkedin.com/in/carlafigueira