

More Cultural Europe in the World



Damien Helly

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Executive summary

The world is changing fast. Cultural flows keep intensifying in our globalised world, where economic hubs also become cultural crossroads. (Re)emerging powers are designing world- wide cultural policies. Europe’s neighbourhood is experiencing historic transformations. Is Europe up to the challenge of adapting its cultural and external policies to the new realities of soft power?

This paper unpacks such concepts as cultural cooperation, cultural relations, cultural diplomacy, foreign cultural policy, cultural exchanges, and public diplomacy to show they all express one dimension of European external cultural relations. Today’s challenge is to combine a higher degree of Europeanisation of national and private external cultural policies together with more culturally sensitive external action. This has to be done globally as much as within Europe by addressing non-European publics visiting the continent.

There is now some recognition, at the highest level, and beyond previous statements and commitments, that culture matters for Europe’s external action. The question is less why than how, and debates have become increasingly sophisticated. Professionals have stopped mentioning “culture” in general, but are now associating cultural action with other policy fields where culture sensitivity brings some added value.

Debates have also resulted in some preliminary shared knowledge in a number of thematic areas: the economic value of culture and the role culture plays in socio-economic growth, culture and development, culture and conflict/violence-prevention and security policies, culture and human rights, cultural heritage, intercultural dialogue. The study provides the reader with dos and don’ts in European external cultural relations, resources to identify best practices and top ten principles to implement them.

Although it is difficult to assess available EU amounts for the next financial phase between 2014 and 2020, one can already base some assumptions on existing resources and expected budget constraints related to the crisis. In addition to the new Creative Europe programme, if some more resources are to be found for external cultural relations they should be looked for within budget envelopes dedicated to enlargement, the neighbourhood, development and cooperation, as well as thematic programmes, irrespective of their evolution in the next seven years. In any case, new funding options will need to be considered, such as trust funds, pooling and sharing, micro-credit and other innovative partnerships with the private sector.

This research has also identified five current archetypes of external cultural policy being conducted by Europeans in the world: the first one is national and state-centred; the second one is decentralised and based on the role of local cultural professionals and local authorities; the third one—complementing national strategies—is EU-centred and consists of mainstreaming culture into EU policies; the fourth one is about empowering cultural networks and private actors to conduct cultural action. The fifth one is organised around coalitions of the groups of states willing to act together.

New concepts and European external cultural innovations will emerge in sufficiently creative environments. The challenge lies in a) the way cultural professionals communicate with non-culture-

related external relations professionals; b) the ways synergies will be found between all stakeholders involved in existing external cultural policy models.

The study recommends 20 measures to boost cultural Europe in the world:

Long-term measures

1. Establish a quality charter for European external cultural relations
2. Create a network of European cultural ambassadors
3. Design thematic and geographically focused cultural strategies with action plans and adequate funding
4. Develop and support knowledge and expertise networks on European external cultural relations, with ramifications in professional training, school and university teaching curricula as well as civil society organisations all over Europe

Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood

5. A rapid cultural reaction mechanism
6. Improved cultural visa delivery
7. A programme called “European cultural learning pass/path”
8. Decentralised support of cultural incubators in big cities
9. Cultural work within Europe itself on cultural and religious relations
10. Open up existing Euro-Mediterranean frameworks to the rest of the world
11. Independent evaluation of the work of the Anna Lindh Foundation
12. European TV and radio cultural programmes for and with the Neighbourhood

Eastern Neighbourhood

13. Culture sensitivity training for EU programming staff in delegations
14. A culture and human rights initiative
15. Cultural freedom broadcasting programme for Belarus
16. Support twinning between Western and Eastern festivals
17. Enlarge the geographical scope of European capitals of culture (ECOC)
18. Large-scale cultural dialogue initiatives between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies
19. Systematising and intensifying education twinning and cooperation exchanges
20. Provide “scenarios for a restructuring of the European cultural architecture”

I. Introduction: Is Europe up to the challenge of adapting its cultural policies to new realities?

The world is changing fast. Cultural flows keep intensifying in our globalised world, where economic hubs also become cultural crossroads. (Re)emerging powers are designing world- wide cultural policies. Europe’s neighbourhood is experiencing historic transformations.¹ “Do European citizens still have some esteem for their culture?” and if it is the case as surveys seem to confirm, what should they do to enjoy the cultural benefits of globalisation?²

This paper has three main objectives:

- Provide some update on the cultural components of the EU’s external action/relations,
- Nourish public debates held in the framework of the More Europe³ campaign in the year 2012,
- Make recommendations for concrete measures to be taken to enhance more cultural Europe in the world.

II. Europe’s external relations: definitions and interests

1. Definitions and related priorities

Speaking of the EU’s external relations or the EU’s external action does not go without ambiguities. It may be understood in various ways: the narrow one is to consider only EU institutions as such; the broader approach (chosen in this paper) is to encompass EU institutions together with EU member states and any other European entity/agent involved in relations with the outside world. These ambiguities have been underlined by some of the questions asked or remarks made about the topic by people interviewed for this study. The starting point of this paper is therefore to take the theme’s ambiguities both as an asset (based on the assumption that a plurality of meaning has the advantage of broadening the scope of the readership) and as a starting point for an analysis of the issues at stake.

There are many ways to take culture⁴ into account within the EU’s external relations, because there are numerous concepts used to express the various ways culture interacts with European foreign affairs.


¹ Phone interview with a cultural relations expert working on a European cultural strategy vis-à-vis China, May 2012.

² [2007 Eurobarometre on cultural values](#) and quote from Radu Mihăileanu’s speech at the 23 May 2012 More Europe Paris debate. See also Damien Helly, *From Who We Are to What We Do Together and How—Avenues for European external cultural relations*, June 2012.

³ www.moreeurope.org

⁴ By culture, we refer to the definition given by the 2007 European Commission’s Communication “An agenda for culture in a globalising world”, COM 2007 (242): “Culture lies at the heart of human development and civilisation. Culture is what makes people hope and dream, by stimulating our senses and offering new ways of looking at reality. It is what brings people together, by stirring dialogue and arousing passions, in a way that unites rather than divides. Culture should be regarded as a set of distinctive spiritual and material traits that

Figure 1: Overlapping definitions



If the core of the matter is about “cultural cooperation”⁵ and “cultural relations” (the former being historically associated to some sort of participation by public entities and the latter being more recently coined by the British Council to match the new statutory autonomy of this organisation), then one of the components of our study is about potential avenues of *giving a European dimension to the support of cultural cooperation and cultural relations between Europeans and the rest of the world.*

If we speak of “cultural diplomacy,” it supposedly implies the (non-exclusive) involvement of diplomats and governmental entities with their own goal of fostering interests and influencing others. In that case, it is about developing some forms of European cultural diplomacy⁶ by *enhancing the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external action.* However, international relations theorists have for some time now argued that “diplomacy” is no longer the monopoly of states or international diplomats. Diplomacy has turned “private,” non-governmental, independent, track two, etc.

characterise a society and social group. It embraces literature and arts as well as ways of life, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”

⁵ Delphine Borione uses the term “cultural cooperation”, *EUNIC 2011 Yearbook*, p. 180.

⁶ Delphine Borione speaks of a “genuine European cultural diplomacy”, *EUNIC 2011 Yearbook*, p. 182.

Table 1 - Unpacking definitions

concept → Key variables ↓	Public diplomacy	Cultural relations	Cultural diplomacy / foreign cultural policy	Cultural cooperation	Cultural regulation / rule- making
Funding source	Foreign affairs / foreign policy department / other state services	Cultural agency, public and/or private	State / foreign affairs institutions / cultural agencies / partnerships possible	Public and/or private	Public / foreign affairs / trade / culture ministries
Political interference	Strong	Often indirect, weak or none	Significant, but reliant on respect for the autonomy of cultural space	Significant, but reliant on respect for the autonomy of cultural space	Strong
Agenda setters	Political authorities	Intermediaries; individual, civil society or culture professionals	Mix of political authorities, cultural agencies / institutes / parastatal body	Mix of cultural agencies, public bodies and civil society or culture professionals	Governments agencies and/or lobby from cultural sector or industries or research/think tanks
Implementers	Governments or public institutions	Culture professionals	Mix of cultural agencies, public bodies and civil society or culture professionals	Mix of cultural agencies, public bodies and civil society or culture professionals	Governments or public institutions
Main partners	Other governments or public institutions	Open to all sorts	Open to all sorts but reliant on political green light/sanction	Open to all sorts but reliant on political green light/sanction	Other governments or public institutions + lobbying groups
Target audience	Opinion-formers Depends on political objectives	Depends on the objectives of the initiative	Depends on a mix of political and cultural objectives	Depends on the objectives of the initiatives	Depends on a mix of political, trade, and cultural objectives
Degree of decentralisation	Depends on the level of the political authority	Usually high	Depends on the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the implementers	Depends on the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the implementers	Depends on the level of the political authority
Export orientation	Export-oriented	Mutuality, and two-way exchange process	Mostly export-oriented but depends on the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the agenda setters	Mostly export-oriented but depends on the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the agenda-setters	Often export-oriented but depends on a mix of political, trade, and cultural objectives
Kind of output	Awareness-raising material / action	Depends on the objectives of the initiative	Support transnational cultural production and cooperation with a varying degree of governmental participation	Mobile cultural production with a varying degree of co-production	Normative output document with a varying degree of legal obligation (convention, law, treaties and international agreements)
Targeted outcome	Visibility and awareness-raising	Mutual understanding and visibility	Mix of visibility, mutual understanding and political rapprochement	Mix of visibility, mutual understanding and political rapprochement	Promotion of innovation and creativity + protection of cultural diversity

In today's globalised and transnational world, almost any stakeholders can engage in some kind of diplomacy. Against this background, the notion of "cultural diplomacy," currently very fashionable,⁷ has become almost as open as the one of cultural relations, and it would be a mistake, according to the author, to fight against the very use of the term "cultural diplomacy" for the sake of semantic purity. Hence the choice by some authors of using the term "transnational European cultural diplomacy."⁸

Speaking of a "foreign cultural policy"⁹ is perhaps the closest approach to the old meaning of "cultural diplomacy," in the sense that it involves governmental bodies in charge of foreign policy. Yet the same remarks made above apply to the concept of "foreign policy," which is no longer the unique property of national diplomats. Foreign policy in contemporary international politics needs to be understood in its broadest sense.¹⁰

One nuance should be paid attention to, however: when one speaks of "foreign cultural policy" or "cultural diplomacy," it seems that *foreign policy, diplomacy (and perhaps external action in general) is being made more cultural and becomes more culture-sensitive*; and when one speaks of "external cultural policy," it seems that *cultural policy is being made more foreign/outward-looking and perhaps also more politically aware*.

If we speak of intercultural dialogue, and even more so of cultural and linguistic diversity and the global regulation of cultural relations (through the production of norms), the debate is about *defining the role of the EU (and its member states) as setting standards based on its fundamental values and as a public rule-maker in the cultural field globally*. This also means reconciling, whenever possible, European value-based discourses and interests-related positions, in, for instance, the fields of market access, cultural quota or distribution chains.

If we speak of "Europeanisation," one strong impetus stems from EU branding: presenting and explaining the EU to the world; exchange with third-country interlocutors about the EU and its visibility falls in the remit of EU public diplomacy and "strategic communication." The EU has official "public diplomacy" tools and structures spread around the world,¹¹ communication, press and visibility policies, implemented by Brussels-based institutions and EU delegations in third countries and to international organisations. If the focus of this paper were on the EU's public diplomacy (which it is not), this study would emphasise *the development of EU communication and visibility policies, practices and tools*. However, it seems that for some EEAS officials, at least in their public speeches, public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy may be used interchangeably and are closely linked and seen as a parts of a coherent policy approach at strategic level.¹² This, in the understanding of the author, is a risky conceptual approximation.

⁷ Rod Fischer, remarks during the 23 May More Europe Paris seminar.

⁸ Gottfried Wagner, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 119.

⁹ Term used by Berthold Franke, p. 175, *EUNIC Yearbook*, and on the IFA's website, interchangeably with "foreign cultural relations", <http://www.ifa.de/en/ifa/ziele/>.

¹⁰ Publications on foreign policy theories by Bertrand Badie, Brian White, Roy Ginsberg, Christopher Hill, Wolfgang Wessels, Thomas Risse-Kapen, Jan Zielonka, Franck Petiteville, Frédéric Charillon.

¹¹ EU centres are definitely a strong public diplomacy tool in industrialised countries. This tool could be maximised by widening its geographical coverage in the world. See the [2011 evaluation of EU centres by evaluation partnerships](#).

¹² Gerhard Sabathil, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 107.

As for cultural policy, the distinction between what is “internal” and what is “external” has also become blurred, given the porosity of borders and, more specifically, the multicultural and multinational nature of many cultural productions and the frequent travelling experience of cultural experiences beyond borders.¹³ This is not only true for policies, but also for the territorialisation of creativity and innovation themselves, which emerge in a global creative sphere without single centres.¹⁴ Exchanging culturally with the world does not necessarily mean that we have to travel, because many non-Europeans travel to Europe. The challenge therefore is also *to address non-European publics within Europe itself.*

Another ambiguity of our theme is the time span within which one can expect decisive policy changes. If we speak of what could be done concretely today to respond to immediate cultural and political challenges, then the debate needs to be about the design of **pilot initiatives**. However, if we speak of the EU’s cultural role in the next decades in the world or in relation to particular powers, the level of analysis and the nature of recommendations get deepened and widened substantially. This paper tries to address both aims, bearing in mind that some proposals and suggestions may sound unrealistic and overambitious to many readers in the short and medium run.

Last but not least, the paper faces the challenge of definitions of “Europe.” Focusing on the EU’s external relations does not provide all the answers. Speaking of Europe is an eternal debate and involves permanent questioning, as was agreed during the 23 May 2012 Paris conference organised by More Europe: there has to be more cultural Europe in the world and a permanent space has to be provided for exchanges on what kind of Europe we seek to promote.¹⁵

Following on from the above—the porosity of such concepts as diplomacy, foreign policy, international/transnational relations and cultural policy—one may question the very hypothesis of paradigm shifts (from diplomacy to relations/cooperation) in external cultural policies.¹⁶ Indeed, this assumption only works when applying rigid and archetypical definitions of “cultural diplomacy” and “cultural relations,” one being depicted as exclusively government and diplomat-led according to a top-down process, the other being more of a bottom-up dynamics involving a variety of civil society actors. From what is said above, these two archetypes may serve the analysis or the understanding of certain policy decisions or priorities, yet they also prevent us from conducting a flexible, pragmatic and tailored examination of cultural policy initiatives that looks beyond borders. The hypothesis of the “paradigm shift” may also be misleading in conveying the implicit message that “cultural diplomacy is bad,” and that “cultural relations are better,” while actually both models have their own faults and benefits. In a way there is some (self-)deception when pretending that cultural relations are not about some sort of national branding, too, without self-interest. If that were the case, many “relations” would just not happen. The question is less either/or, cultural relations or cultural diplomacy, and more about the conditions/principles of cultural relation: reciprocity, mutuality, exchange, cooperation, etc., and the public discourse about them. There is no need to recall that there is no obligation for those who do not want to work with public- or foreign-affairs-financed

¹³ This point was clearly emphasised by some speakers in Paris on 23 May 2012, underlining the fact that they do not take professional citizenship or borders into account when programming cultural work.

¹⁴ Helmut K Anheier, Yudhishtir Raj Isar, *Cultural Expression, Creativity and Innovation and Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance*, Cultures and Globalization series, Sage, 2010 and 2012.


¹⁵ Damien Helly, *From Who We Are to What We Do Together and How – Avenues for European external cultural relations*, June 2012.

¹⁶ Rod Fischer, Carla Figueira, *Revisiting EU Member States’ international cultural relations*, 2011.

agencies that have a political mandate to do so. But the doors should remain open for collaborative approaches of all kinds, including civil society actors and networks as well as those working under the aegis of political paymasters. Appropriate solutions need to be found on a case-by-case basis, provided certain conditions and principles, quality- and values-related, are met.

This being said, the hypothesis of paradigm shifts¹⁷ in cultural policy models has the advantage of identifying some of their main features, opposing diplomacy to cooperation/relations, bilateral to multilateral, national to European, etc. Taking some of these variables further, one may consider the scope of the ambiguities related to our research object as presented in the chart below.

Figure 2 - Europe, culture and the world: where do we want to go?



¹⁷ Rod Fischer, Carla Figueira, *Revisiting EU Member States' international cultural relations*, 2011 and Horia-Roman Patapievicu speaking of the Romanian experience, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 160.

2. The diversity and divergence of interests related to Europe's external cultural relations

In light of the discussions on definitions analysed in the previous section, any debate on European external cultural relations needs to clarify the interests of all the shareholders/stakeholders and expertise communities at stake, preferably by engaging them actively in the debate.

The first group is the community of **cultural professionals** in Europe. They want to do concrete work, and for that resources and support are needed; it is probably not their main concern where they come from, EU institutions and/or member states. However practice-centred these demands are, there are many cultural operators (and artists) who have a genuine interest in contributing to a transnational “common-wealth,” a fair and cultured, cosmopolitan approach to shaping globalisation. In that respect they form a relevant community for policy formation at post-national, and European level.¹⁸ Still, interviews conducted for this study have also shown that for some professionals there may be a conflict between “intra-European” priorities (*what to do for “our” artists on “our” continent?*) and internationalised cultural work, particularly in a time of crisis.¹⁹ Those opting for more globalised cultural exchanges argue that borders matter much less than before and that locally created cultural work is likely to “travel” through existing transnational networks.²⁰

For those who want to develop their outreach abroad and beyond Europe, larger cultural budgets should be made available at all levels. Access to resources should be managed in a lean way; this has been stressed in particular with regards to the EU's support-bureaucracy.²¹ Improving administrative procedures is a second objective for advocacy.²² Thirdly, cultural professionals need clear interlocutors, something that is now missing at the European level in particular; they also need to have their voices heard by policy-makers as well as managers (as one interviewee bluntly stated: “Cultural institutes don't know what exists”).²³ At the EU level, consultation would enable the institutions to respond to cultural demands from third parties,²⁴ and would ensure that well-informed decisions are made.

Among **the community of national institutes for culture and other governmental agencies supporting external cultural relations**,²⁵ diversity of (national) interests is not only a sign of Europe's much-praised cultural diversity, but of competition on (cultural) “markets” as well. In this

¹⁸ Email exchange with Gottfried Wagner, July 2012.

¹⁹ For instance, people have diverging views about the scope of the new Creative Europe and its degree of openness to non-EU countries. Other experts consider that “More Europe in the world is as important as More Europe in Europe itself” (phone interviews with cultural experts, May and June 2012). See also Alain Fohr's statement at the More Europe Paris conference on 23 May 2012 mentioned in Damien Helly, [From Who We Are to What We Do Together and How: Avenues for European external cultural relations](#).

²⁰ Phone interviews with Ferdinand Richard and Catherine Cornet, May 2012, and presentations by Pierre Giner and Malte Bergmann at the More Europe Paris debate on 23 May 2012.

²¹ Interview with Stéphane Lam and Lucie Brosset, Pavillon rouge des arts, May 2012.

²² Interview with a cultural cooperation expert, June 2012

²³ Interview with a cultural expert and civil society activist, June 2012.

²⁴ “When we speak of potential publics in Europe without Chinese counterparts, we actually struggle to indicate to them contact points that would bridge the gap between our local level of action and the EU level of their request.” Phone interview with Stéphane Lam and Lucie Brosset, May 2012.

²⁵ The author thanks Gottfried Wagner for his input on this particular theme.

environment, the European network of National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC)²⁶ plays a specific role because it represents most of the national resources for external cultural relations and permits some newly developing resources to be pooled and shared. In the process of European policy formation regarding external cultural relations, EUNIC has a particular interest in establishing itself as a main actor; the ambiguity of cooperation and competition, however, presents significant challenges for united advocacy.

Interviews conducted by the author show—taking into account the fundamental ambivalence at play—that experts have mixed views on the future of EUNIC as an effective actor in European external cultural relations. Firstly, it is often thought that EUNIC is dominated by the big three, namely France, Germany and the UK, and that smaller countries have little influence on decision-making and priority- and strategy-setting. Secondly, the network still lacks sustained funding of its own based on membership fees at global and at cluster level. Thirdly, EUNIC is deemed by some to be “a myth” or “in a phase of stagnation”²⁷ and is said to have failed thus far to seriously bring together divergent national interests, traditions and approaches. For instance, there is undoubtedly a certain resistance to the term “cultural diplomacy” and the practices relating to it among some stakeholders, who strongly emphasise the need to keep the cultural space at arm’s length—not to say, complete inviolability or independence—from governments.

Others—and they number more than a few—emphasise, however, that EUNIC has great potential and could prove to be indispensable, were it to get its act together.²⁸ Governance presents a delicate challenge to EUNIC, not only in general, but in particular when it comes to its becoming a strategic partner. Yet National Cultural Institutes—and hybrid networks like EUNIC—do not function in a vacuum: they reflect the different interests of their paymasters, the national administrations, and politically changing views on what external cultural relations can and should mean and “earn.” Finally, discussions (and sometimes tensions) about the nature and the form of the EU’s representation abroad in general²⁹ are having an impact on internal EUNIC management processes. It has also been pointed out that vision and strategy are needed for EUNIC to position itself as a strong interlocutor to EU institutions—in that respect the EEAS plays a key role—contributing to shape external policies.

For **small(er) and even mid-sized countries** “more cultural Europe in the world” might mean less of a risk of losing visibility and reveal cultural exchange to be a huge opportunity. The multi-lateralisation of external cultural action includes the pooling of resources, sharing spaces, ideas and personnel, while “competitive advantages” due to specific cultural and historical developments may lead to more space for smaller countries, beyond traditional ways of investing in nation-branding and the export of national cultural production,³⁰ or at least complementing those.

²⁶ European Union National Institutes for Culture.

²⁷ Phone interviews with cultural experts, May and June 2012.

²⁸ For that goal, a change of pace in finding joint strategies of what Europeanisation means seems to be utterly crucial. This would imply mediating diverging views and some openness in addressing conflicts and conflict-solving mechanisms. Email exchange with Gottfried Wagner, July 2012.

²⁹ Phone interview with a cultural expert close to EUNIC, May 2012. On debates among Member States and the EEAS, see also <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xlix/42821.htm>

³⁰ Several interviewees pointed to the fact that small countries from Central and Eastern Europe still rely on a “national public relations and show-off approach” to cultural relations.

Not only do **France, Germany and the UK** have the most developed cultural networks in the world, they also have the biggest external cultural budgets. Remarkable steps have been taken to embrace new European strategies and action, among them a disproportionately “high” material support for EUNIC in its inception phase, but also—according to their mission statement, e.g. in the case of Goethe Institute—for pioneering bi- or trilateral joint action models, etc. Today, it has been stated that to beef up credibility, opting for more cultural Europe in the world should be supported by new models of cooperation (beyond additive co-housing, for example) and by providing opportunities for European partners who have a lot to offer in particular fields but less resources than others. In a time of crisis, “selfless” sharing is an even bigger hurdle, and as one speaker during the 23 May More Europe Paris seminar stated, the motto often seems to be: “Help yourself first, and then (cultural) Europe will help you.”

“Don’t miss the crisis” is another quote heard in the cultural context, as well. Even the “big fish” have to economise, some quite substantially. Pooling and sharing becomes a logical and almost unavoidable alternative. This helps to demystify terms like “solidarity,” on the one hand, and helps to strengthen cooperation instead. Cooperation becomes the red thread along which all the stakeholders could organise their debates.

Regarding **third countries**, national European interests and perspectives on appropriate cultural strategies clearly diverge. In the case of China, it seems Europeans have not yet found a compromise between two complementary priorities: general market-access conditions on the one hand and the lifting of administrative barriers to enhanced cultural work on the other.³¹

Some in **civil society organisations and networks** are pointing to another potential discrepancy: speaking of “more cultural Europe” may function as a Trojan horse for national cultural institutes to compete with them in receiving more EU funds,³² they say. There is a trend, they add, in which national cultural institutes and national agencies are shifting towards an implementing role, in competition with the cultural professionals that they used to support financially. This conflict of interest presents a serious challenge not only to the relations between civil society organisations and governmental agencies, but also to the very nature of external cultural policy models that Europeans policy-makers and cultural professionals want to promote in the future.

Furthermore, the abovementioned ambiguity regarding a possible paradigm shift in external cultural policies could be interpreted as a sign of ongoing mistrust among the various experts’ communities working on cultural issues. In particular, those criticising the continuation of, as they say, “old-fashioned” cultural diplomacy seem to be afraid of national hidden agendas pushed by certain countries. Former European colonial powers are perceived as maintaining some kind of hidden agenda vis-à-vis their so-called “spheres of influence,” where they are keen to maintain not only their political and economic grip but their cultural and linguistic grip as well. This is held to be true by some, even in cases where the national cultural institutes of former colonial powers enjoy a large degree of autonomy from the respective foreign affairs ministries or other political paymasters. Addressing mistrust, misperception and suspicion among former colonial powers and the other states in Europe could therefore become an explicit item for debate.

³¹ Phone interview with a cultural expert working on a European cultural strategy vis-à-vis China, May 2012.

³² Phone interview with a civil society organisation staff member, May 2012.

Several **other expertise communities**, which at first sight do not have obvious interests in the theme of this study, should, however, be engaged more systematically by the cultural professionals.

The first one is the **community of public finance managers**, be it the finance ministries, or DGs in the European Commission—finance, trade, enterprise and development—and the culture and finance committees in parliaments and the EP, all those who are actually making decisions on macro budget allocations. Not associating these experts—particularly the more sceptical ones—to the dialogue on the value of culture in external relations would be a serious shortcoming.³³

The second to be targeted is obviously the **diplomatic community**, at European (EEAS, commission) and national (foreign affairs ministries) level. Not all professional diplomats by far know (and appreciate) the added value of cultural work for development, growth, conflict prevention, education and trade. They often confuse public diplomacy with cultural diplomacy. Some are sensitive to the political value of cultural heritage initiatives.³⁴ To anchor the added value of culture in socioeconomic growth, in conflict and violence prevention and resolution, intercultural dialogue and democratisation still require a lot of advocacy. In this regard, foreign policy **think tanks**, because of their close interaction with diplomatic communities, should be engaged more regularly in debates about the topics discussed in the present paper. Several interviews with heads of prestigious foreign policy expertise platforms show that although external cultural relations are not always at the centre of their work, they recognise their value and central role for European foreign affairs. But the essence of the added value of cultural action in external relations is so far not very well understood.³⁵

The third target group is **the development cooperation community**, which has little knowledge of the added value of culture in development aid. Increasingly focused on poverty alleviation and Millennium development goals, this (diverse) community should be approached and offered the opportunity to develop sustained dialogue on the benefits of mutual cooperation between cultural action and development cooperation.

Finally, **the security community**—for whom culture is, in their field, hardly more than a basic knowledge of local habits in areas where they intervene—has a lot to benefit from a deepened exchange of experience and best practice with cultural professionals. This is not only true for crisis-prone contexts but also for more sustainable and long-term security cooperation with third countries and societies. Again, the European cultural sector has a lot of internal know-how on cooperation with security actors (be they police, justice or penitentiary, but also civil protection and the military).

Last but not least, in times of crisis, there is an urgent need to systematise **public-private partnerships** in the cultural field, to ensure that sufficient funding is gathered around all sorts of relevant cultural initiatives. Reaching out to private companies, philanthropic foundations and private consultancy firms is an imperious necessity for cultural professionals calling for more cultural Europe in the world. In this context, it is urgent to have a better understanding of the interests of **cultural industries** in their diversity, especially given the fact that, according to some experts, there are “conflicts of interests between locally rooted cultural industries and major globalised ones, the

³³ This approach has been applied by DEVCO in the Mediterranean for its regional cultural programmes. Phone interview with Chrystelle Lucas, May 2012.

³⁴ Phone interview with an EEAS diplomat working in the Eastern Neighbourhood, May 2012.

³⁵ Phone interview with Christian Lequesne, Director of the CERI. June 2012.

latter being usually favoured by the DG Trade and DG Enterprise of the European Commission.”³⁶ There are more good reasons for increased private public partnership; one has to do with an openness to logics other than public ones, which adds effectiveness, flexibility and fresh thinking.

III. European external cultural actions: state of the play and lessons learned³⁷

In the last decade, a lot of work has been done on the development of European external cultural relations. A first conceptual phase, consisting of making a stronger case for cultural action as an added value in the EU’s international affairs, is now over. There is now some recognition at the highest level, and beyond previous commitments, that culture matters for Europe’s external action. Since 2008, with the Slovenian and French Presidency, the European Agenda for culture and its third objective and even more so with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we have now entered a first implementation phase in which practitioners and policy-makers, including the European Parliament,³⁸ have started to transmute political intentions and principles into programmes and actions.

The question is less why than how, and debates have become increasingly sophisticated. Professionals have stopped mentioning “culture” in general, and are now associating cultural action with other policy fields where culture sensitivity brings some added value. The development of European external cultural relations can now be understood as a combination of tools, debates and working directions, tailored to specific thematic or geographic priorities. Some preliminary conclusions can be already indicated – for example the Dos and Don’ts presented in *Box 1*—no matter how radical some individual comments may be.

Debates have also resulted in the gathering of preliminary shared knowledge in a number of thematic areas:

1. The economic value of culture and the role of culture in socio-economic growth

In the last decade, cultural professionals have gathered evidence and research to prove that cultural policies pay off, make a difference, and bring added value. This has mostly been done within Europe. Ground-breaking work relating to the role of European capitals of culture or European regional funds, analyses developed by the European Cultural Foundation’s Lab for culture, the Green Paper on culture and creative industries, and the creation of the Council of Europe’s cultural policy Compendium are some of these initiatives. This work and expertise is now being used to inspire

³⁶ Phone interview with Ferdinand Richard, May 2012.

³⁷ This section is based on interviews conducted for the study and desk research results.

³⁸ *Report on the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external cultural actions*, 31 March 2011, by rapporteur Marietje Schaake.

external cultural action. A standard methodology is still lacking, but efforts are being made to fine-tune impact-measurement approaches that could be applied to specific programmes or initiatives.³⁹

Box 1 - What is to be avoided in European external cultural relations

- Appointing bureaucrats and mid-ranking diplomats to craft European cultural strategies⁴⁰
- Running the risk that the use of funding mechanisms can be blocked for political reasons (typically the case for large EU funding envelopes negotiated upfront with political authorities)⁴¹
- Adding several nation-branding initiatives under the European umbrella without any collaborative and conjoint approach⁴²
- Approaching third countries' rigid or overly bureaucratic political authorities in a divided manner⁴³
- Working in isolation within a cultural experts' community
- Focusing on budget preservation without providing strategic visions⁴⁴

2. Culture and development

One policy area where culture sensitivity has been strongly promoted since 2008 is development cooperation. Following the momentum created by rotating presidencies, EU institutions and the European Commission in particular with its DG DEVCO have accumulated experience and knowledge on the “culture and development nexus.” One of the illustrations is the co-production by the European Commission and a group of national agencies of two brochures entitled “Culture and development: action and impact” (see box on best practices). The two documents are a rare resource for those in search of inspiration when designing useful and successful external cultural initiatives. With a rather high degree of institutionalisation, culture and development initiatives are likely to expand, offering new opportunities for cultural professionals to step in.⁴⁵ Interviews conducted for this study, however, show that the impact of cultural action is not always easy to measure (and therefore to justify vis-à-vis empirical diehards). Pressure on impact measurement to justify EU budgets for culture in the Mediterranean is increasing, despite the progress made and a renewed attention for the Arab world after the Arab democratic wave.⁴⁶

³⁹ See for instance the British Council's brochure entitled “Trust Pays”. Although the choice of case studies could be discussed and found to be controversial, this study demonstrates that rational and cost-efficiency narratives on the value of cultural relations are possible, if not totally convincing.

⁴⁰ Phone interview with a cultural expert working on an EU cultural strategy vis-à-vis China, May 2012.

⁴¹ Although no thorough evaluation has been conducted about the Anna Lindh Foundation, several interviewees expressed the need for it.

⁴² Ruth Ur's statement at the More Europe Paris debate, 23 May 2012.

⁴³ Phone interview with a cultural expert working on a European cultural strategy vis-à-vis China, May 2012.

⁴⁴ Phone interview with Marjiete Schaake, June 2012. “The cultural sector's narrative is too much on the need to preserve budget. It lacks the professional approach of proportionate and appropriate strategic lobbying.”

⁴⁵ Interview with European Commission staff members, April 2012.

⁴⁶ Phone interview with Chrystelle Lucas, May 2012. “For me, there is real impact when people who have worked in our programmes in the past have become decision-makers (...) but this can take 20 years!”

3. Culture and conflict/violence-prevention and security policies

The contribution of cultural action to the prevention of violence and conflict, and to peace-building, has not gained as much political clout as the culture and development nexus. Although there are numerous cases of encouraging examples and best practice in crisis areas, it seems a critical mass of political mobilisation is still lacking to upgrade this theme on the European external action agenda.⁴⁷ For measuring impact in volatile and unstable contexts, research and methodological work still has to be done to produce and efficiently communicate comprehensive, legitimate and politically backed-up material on the topic.

4. “Culture and ...”—other areas

Several other dimensions of European external cultural relations deserve deeper analysis and attention, as they are currently being invested by various interest groups. Specific studies of their implications for European external action should be devoted to trade relations, property rights, the regulation of the ICT and of the Internet, the development of digital economies and digital diplomacies.⁴⁸

Translation, interpretation and multilingualism have also been very much below the radar screen of European external relations, while they actually play an essential role not only in intercultural dialogue but also as a catalyst for cultural consumption. Recent programmes on translation in the Mediterranean might create a new dynamic.⁴⁹ As for the **culture and human rights** nexus being—*de facto* but in rather piecemeal way⁵⁰—already covered by existing EU and national policies, it might be envisaged that this policy area, comprising numerous aspects (the protection of cultural workers’ rights, the conducting of a value-based diplomacy, support for civil society initiatives), could attract further political attention and increased civil society mobilisation⁵¹.

5. Cultural heritage

In the field of **cultural heritage**, European countries have acquired enormous experience, thanks in part to the EU and the Council of Europe’s programmes. However, ongoing cooperation has kept a rather low profile in comparison to other sub-sectors of external cultural action. There is a danger of underestimating the value of cultural heritage policies, not only for job creation but also for the quality enhancement of diplomatic relations at the government, but also city or regional, level.

⁴⁷ To name but a few; Helmut K Anheier, Yudhishtir Raj Isar, *Conflicts and Tensions*, Culture and Globalization series, Sage, 2007. See also the work of Search for Common Ground, the Jenin Freedom Theatre or Radio France Philharmonic head Myung-Whun Chung’s invitation to North Korean musicians in March 2012. The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy also provides numerous resources on the role of culture in prevention and reconciliation.

⁴⁸ To some extent, this has been done through a mapping of the cultural sector in China by KEA.

⁴⁹ Transeuropéennes/Anna Lindh Foundation, [A Mapping of translation in the Euro-Mediterranean region](#), June 2012.

⁵⁰ Damien Helly, *When Human Rights Meet Cultural Relations*.

⁵¹ Phone interview with Mary Ann DeVlieg, May 2012.

6. Intercultural dialogue

Last but not least, **intercultural dialogue**, which has been a primary focus for the EU in the aftermath of the adoption of the UNESCO convention, has now to unfold in the various ways described above. Beyond the necessary general principles framing intercultural understanding and dialogue, it is through the actual concrete practice of cultural relations and exchange that dialogue becomes effective and brings genuine change.⁵²

Box 2 - Good practice in external cultural relations

Mapping and the collection of practice; examples:

- Culture and development brochures by the European Commission
- Best practice in the IETM civil society platform study on access to culture
- Best practice in the Council of Europe's web resources and Compendium
- Best practice databases associated to specific projects

List of best practice principles

- Unite around a theme, an idea, a project⁵³
- Make sense locally and promote local people, assets and potential⁵⁴
- Join up with others in partnerships⁵⁵
- Think beyond all sorts of borders and barriers⁵⁶
- Aim at cultural professionals' autonomy⁵⁷
- Unleash culture's economic potential⁵⁸
- Promote fundamental rights directly or indirectly⁵⁹
- Prove and communicate how you made the difference⁶⁰

Success stories

Progress made on policies supporting artists' mobility.⁶¹ A combination of

- bottom-up lobbying from cultural professionals
- the European Commission's political priorities and Open Method of Coordination groups on mobility
- the European Parliament's sensitivity to civil society claims

led to innovation in legislative measures and to the creation of funds (e.g., long since, the Roberto Cimetta Fund or Step Beyond).

Progress made on the culture and development nexus.⁶² A combination of

⁵² The Europe-China cultural compass.

⁵³ Phone interview with Stéphane Lam and Lucie Brosset, Pavillon rouge des arts, May 2012.

⁵⁴ [Culture and development – actions and impact 2012](#), p. 116.

⁵⁵ Ruth Ur, Paris, 23 May 2012.

⁵⁶ Moukhtar Kocache, Copenhagen, 13 June 2012.

⁵⁷ Phone interview with Ferdinand Richard, May 2012.

⁵⁸ The experience of the use of EU regional funds to promote local growth is of particular interest in that regard.

⁵⁹ Phone interviews with Mary Ann DeVlieg, Christian Lequesne.

⁶⁰ Interview with Martin Hope, April 2012.

⁶¹ Phone interview with Mary Ann DeVlieg, IETM, June 2012. See also Richard Polacek, [Study on impediments to mobility](#) and [Roberto Cimetta Fund](#).

- various national and institutional political interests, EU rotating presidency conclusions
- international momentum on Millennium Development Goals
- lobbying from the cultural sector

led to the Brussels declaration, EC brochures on best practice, a dedicated web platform and the beginning of training activities on the value of culture in development within EU delegations.

IV. Which resources for more culture in Europe's external action?

At a national level, some studies have already shown a forthcoming decrease of budget resources for culture in general and external cultural relations in particular. The latter is the case for most of the national cultural institutes and agencies operating abroad, with a few temporary exceptions (Ireland, Slovenia).⁶³ The crisis has not only had some impact on European budgets, but also on the EU's partners: for instance, in 2011 Canada cancelled its call for proposals for transatlantic exchange and degrees and partnership. It would be useful to further assess the impact of the crisis on partner countries in their cultural relations with the EU.

Despite anticipated cuts and the fact that resources remain concentrated in a small group of countries—namely the “big three”: Germany, the UK (currently having to deal with another drastic cut) and France—the sum total of national budgets for external cultural relations is still far from irrelevant. The EUNIC 2011 Yearbook estimated that the 29 EUNIC members had a turnover of 2.5 billion Euros in 2011.⁶⁴

Furthermore, these budgets should be associated with the existence of a wide international network of external cultural agencies, offices and antennas, which represent a fantastic asset in terms of human resources, skills, knowhow and experience.

1. EU financial perspectives 2014-2020 and the diversity of EU instruments funding cultural action and external relations

Although it is difficult to assess available EU amounts for the next financial phase between 2014 and 2020, one can already base some assumptions on existing resources. In comparison with other EU budget lines, the EU budget for culture is very limited and there is a risk that it would be further reduced because of the crisis. The Commission has envisaged various policy options for cultural budgets, including the merging of existing programmes (the culture programme, media). This could lead to a decrease in the internal community budget for culture. It remains to be seen whether the Commission's proposal to have a 37% increased budget for its 2013-2020 Creative Europe programme (1.8 bn Euros) will be approved.

⁶² Phone interviews with Mary Ann De Vlieg, Philippe Peyredieu du Charlat, Gyongyi Mikita, Martin Hope.

⁶³ Rod Fischer, Carla Figueira, *Revisiting EU Member States' international cultural relations*, 2011.

⁶⁴ Unfortunately, time did not allow the author to work on a breakdown of this figure on the basis of a systematic investigation about the EU 27 national budgets for external cultural relations. This should be a must for any further research on funding resources.

What is also very significant and relevant is the size of the cultural components of EU structural funds during the previous financial phase, estimated at approximately 6 bn Euros, i.e. about 1.7% on average.⁶⁵ Although these funds are for domestic European cultural programmes, they give an indication of the share of culture in the overall policy of regional redistribution among European countries. It would be useful to know the corresponding percentage for culture-related components of the EU's external relations.

Similarly, data (which vary according to definitions and methodologies from 0.02% to 0.15%)⁶⁶ on the share of culture in the overall EU budget is a telling indicator of the weight of this sector in European integration policy strategies.

The EU external relations budget—in particular cooperation instruments like the pre-Accession Instrument, the Development Cooperation and European Neighbourhood Instruments (PAI, DCI and ENPI, but also EIDHR) to be replaced by a European Endowment for Democracy, the Instrument for stability (IfS) and cooperation instruments with industrialised countries—are much bigger than the ones devoted exclusively to culture. DCI is around 44 bn Euros, PAI and ENPI 15 bn each and IfS over 4 bn. If some more resources are to be found for cultural external relations, they should be looked for within those budget envelopes, irrespective of their evolution in the next seven years.

The EU has signed cooperation, partnership and/or association agreements with each region and country of the world, agreements which express the thematic cooperation priorities funded by these instruments. In 2007 the EU's funding for external action was dispatched in 35 different regulations and around 90 budget lines. Even if this plethora of administrative tools is simplified, it is to be expected that funding mechanisms and legal instruments will still be numerous. This means that any inquiry about potential funding for cultural action would require thorough study and examination of the whole spectrum of EU funding abroad.

The CFSP budget, which is separate from external relations instruments, has historically been limited (reaching around 370 M Euros in 2012) and mostly dedicated to specific crisis-management operations and policies (namely security and non-proliferation policies), leaving very little space for culture-related funding. However, it has happened in the past that some CSDP missions have actually used parts of their budget to sponsor ad hoc culture-related events implemented by other European organisations, like the EUPM (EU Police Mission in Bosnia), which devoted some of its resources—albeit in a limited way—to cultural events and initiatives.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ ERICarts 2010, based on ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/themes/statistics/2007_culture.pdf, quoted in Wiesand, "The creative sector, how could it contribute to development?", Powerpoint presentation.

⁶⁶ Both figures were quoted first by Radu Mihăileanu and second by Delphine Borione at the More Europe Paris seminar on 23 May 2012.

⁶⁷ Interview with a EUPM staff member, Sarajevo, 6 June 2012.

Table 2 - Where to find money for European external cultural relations?⁶⁸

Instruments	Amounts available in Euros	Time frame
EU instruments		
EU culture programme including special actions to third countries	400 M, of which only a part goes to the work with third countries	2007-2013
MEDIA ⁶⁹	budget: 754.9 M	2007-2013
MEDIA mundus ⁷⁰	15 M	2011-2013
Erasmus Mundus ⁷¹	230 M 493 M	2004-2008 2009-2013
Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries (ICI) ⁷² and ICI plus Example: EU-Canada Education Exchange programme	Around 2 M	each year
European Development Fund (EDF) ⁷³ Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Cultures ACP Cultures+ ⁷⁴	12 M	2009-2011 2011-2013
European Endowment for Democracy	Budget still to be approved	2014-2020
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) ⁷⁵ of which: Investing in people – culture programme	around 16.9 bn 50 M	2007-2013
Pre Accession Instrument (IPA) ⁷⁶	15 bn	
Eastern Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) ⁷⁷ of which: Eastern Partnership culture programme Euromed Heritage ⁷⁸ Euromed Audiovisual ⁷⁹ SPRING ⁸⁰ programme	12 bn 17 M 11 M 22 M (to be confirmed)	2010-2013 2008-2012 2011-2013 2014-2020
Instrument for Stability (IFS) ⁸¹	2 bn	2007-2013

⁶⁸ This table is not exhaustive. It aims to give an idea of the wide range of funding instruments available in Europe and to suggest much more detailed research for potential funding sources.

⁶⁹ MEDIA is the EU support programme for the European audiovisual industry.

⁷⁰ MEDIA Mundus supports cooperation between audiovisual professionals in Europe and the rest of the world.

⁷¹ ERASMUS Mundus “aims to enhance quality in higher education through scholarships and academic cooperation between Europe and the rest of the world.”

⁷² The Instrument funds, among others, people-to-people contacts and public diplomacy. Countries include, among others, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.

⁷³ For action with Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.

⁷⁴ Supports cultural industries in the region.

⁷⁵ Mix of pro-development funding mechanisms in the world.

⁷⁶ Funds programmes in candidate and potential candidate countries: Turkey, Iceland, Western Balkans.

⁷⁷ Funds cooperation programmes in the Eastern and Southern (Mediterranean) Neighbourhood.

⁷⁸ Funds partnerships between conservation experts and heritage institutions from the countries of the Mediterranean region.

⁷⁹ Supports audiovisual sectors in the region and their development.

⁸⁰ Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth, includes a promise of 22 M Euros to support political parties, trade unions and NGOs through the Endowment for Democracy and an initiative to strengthen media and human rights dialogue. Operational issues still have to be discussed in 2012 to frame 2014-2020.

⁸¹ Deals with crisis management, conflict prevention and peace building and situations of fragility.

EU/UNESCO Expert facility on cultural governance in developing countries	1 M	2010 onwards
EU structural funds / culture components	Around 6 bn	
Member States instruments (sample)		
European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) ⁸²	2.9 bn (turnover)	2011
of which, <i>inter alia</i> national budgets for external cultural action:		
Goethe Institute ⁸³	278 M	Annually
Institut Français + Alliances françaises + other agencies ⁸⁴	630 M	2012
British Council ⁸⁵	865 M (turnover)	2011
Instituto Cervantes ⁸⁶	102 M	2011

2. The challenges ahead in funding scenarios for a more cultural Europe in the world

For those keen to promote culture in the EU’s external action, there are several challenges related to financial resources. The first one is to use trustable and comparable data on cultural employment in Europe,⁸⁷ on the weight of culture in domestic EU policies at national but also at regional and local level, as well as in EU external policies (both EU and Member States). The share of what would be considered cultural work in internal European policies and in external policies and actions could then be compared. Such comparisons could then inspire knowledge-based targets for the funding resources being called for. For instance, one option could be to set a target percentage for culture in the EU’s external policies and to have it adopted by EU policy-makers. One criterion for this advocacy target could be a match between the percentage of culture-related funding within structural funds and within external relations budgets. **The average of 1.7% in structural funds, to be matched in funding for external relations**, could be a basic starting point in this regard.

Information about available EU funds for external cultural action is still difficult to access. There is a need for **a sustainable web-based open-access information point on EU funding sources for cultural action abroad**. Such a tool would help to have a comprehensive view of potential funding sources for an increasingly culture-sensitive external action. It would help to maximise synergies between ongoing and future external action (foreign policy, education and culture, security, development programmes) on the one hand and culturally aware/culturally focused approaches on the other.

⁸² EUNIC Yearbook 2011.

⁸³ Unverified source.

⁸⁴ <http://www.senat.fr/rap/a11-110-1/a11-110-10.html#toc8>

⁸⁵ <http://www.britishcouncil.org/about/funding-sources>

⁸⁶ http://www.cervantes.es/memoria_ic_web_2010-2011/html/cifras.html

⁸⁷ “In 2009, at EU-27 level, 3.6 million people were employed in the five main cultural sectors of economic activity presented above, representing 1.7 % of total employment.” *EU cultural statistics pocket book, 2011*, p. 64. The pocketbook also indicates that the EU’s trade balance in cultural goods was still positive in 2009. A 2006 KEA study gave the following figures for the year 2004: 3.1% of active people working in the cultural sector (around 5 million), representing 2.6% of EU GDP.

Box 3 - Pooling and sharing: trust funds, joint pots and co-funding models

The shrinking of resources in theory should encourage resource pooling.

Co-funding is a very traditional feature of cultural action. However, budgetary constraints are pushing states, EU institutions and other organisations to invest more in partnerships and cooperative endeavours to support cultural work.

The advantages of trust funds are the following:

- they are more flexible than bureaucratically managed instruments
- they are freed from too tight political interference
- they can be democratically managed by management and supervisory boards
- they are open to all sources of funding, no matter what their size or public or private origin is

The generalisation of EU trust funds in external relations will become effective in 2012.⁸⁸

Some models seem to function, like the EHU trust fund for Belarus European Humanities Universities based in Latvia and receiving funds from a variety of sponsors.⁸⁹

During the 2012 Cannes Film Festival the creation of a trust fund for supporting film production was to be discussed⁹⁰.

Trust funds may also be useful to consider emergency actions in case of crises. This was for instance suggested on a paper calling for cultural emergency teams.⁹¹

3. Independent funding sources

With budgets decreasing due to the current crisis, EU institutions, Member States and cultural professionals have already started to look for alternative sources of funding for external and cultural action.⁹² The European Commission has started to consider strategies for pooled funding, public private partnerships, the blending of grants and loans, and the generalisation of trust funds in a number of policy areas. The role of the private sector, of philanthropic organisations, private sponsors and other independent funding organisations will thus have to be reassessed regularly and on the basis of concrete experience, to identify best practice in innovative and cooperative funding mechanisms.

⁸⁸ Financial regulations: what's new for beneficiaries of EU funds?, 27 June 2012, Memo 12/501.

⁸⁹ <http://www.ehustrustfund.org/main/about>

⁹⁰ Phone interview with Chrystelle Lucas, May 2012.

⁹¹ Ferdinand Richard, *The role of Culture in Defence and Security Policy: Soft power and political ecology*.

⁹² Euromed audiovisual II, for instance, has already conducted information-sharing activities on cinema public funding mechanisms. Cooperation with the European Investment Bank on urban centre development and with the banking sector (training on cinema funding) is ongoing. Phone interview with Chrystelle Lucas, May 2012.

The criteria of eligibility for the allocation of certain EU funding facilities should also be examined in detail to ensure that the professional cultural sector and industries in their diversity (including national institutes and agencies for culture, private companies and civil society networks) have access to it.⁹³

It is to be expected that in the near future, access to EU funding will remain cumbersome and almost impossible for small non-European organisations in need of limited amounts in a flexible manner. This is why some experts have started to work on alternative funding options inspired by microcredit methods or traditional community saving funds.⁹⁴

V. Models for an enhanced cultural dimension in European external action

1. A diversity of external cultural governance models

There are currently five archetypes of external cultural policy being conducted by Europeans in the world:

- the first one is national and state centred;
- the second one is decentralised and based on the role of local cultural professionals and local authorities;
- the third one—complementing national strategies—is EU-centred and consists of mainstreaming culture into EU policies;
- the fourth one is about empowering cultural networks and private actors to conduct cultural action;
- the fifth one is organised around coalitions of the groups of states willing to act together.

The key features/variables used for this typology of European external cultural actions are the following: the nature of funding; the degree of government's participation; the nature of agenda setters; the type of implementers; the potential partners of a given action.

⁹³ Phone interviews with a cultural consulting firm staff member and with a cultural network coordinator.

⁹⁴ Phone interview with Ferdinand Richard, May 2012.

Table 3 - EU external cultural governance models

Driving concept → Key variables ↓	EU coordinated mainstreaming	Decentralised	National and state- centred	National coalitions of the willing	Privatised / network-based
1. Funding source	EU primarily, open to EU criteria-based partnerships	Primarily local authorities and cultural organisations based abroad, open to partnerships	States primarily	States primarily, open to partnerships, with EU in particular	Open to issue-based partnerships
2. Government's participation	Strong	Depends on the degree of autonomy enjoyed by agenda setters	Strong	Strong	Weak
3. Agenda setters	EU institutions in consultation with platforms and networks	Cultural professionals, local authorities	Foreign affairs / cultural agencies / culture ministries potentially in response to culture professionals	State coalitions and network-steering bodies, potentially in response to culture professionals	Private coalitions and network-steering bodies
4. Implementers	EU contracted implementers according to EU admin procedures	Mostly cultural professionals—wide spectrum	Mostly cultural public sector and cultural professionals	Mostly cultural public sector and cultural professionals	Cultural professionals
5. Potential partners	Contractors + EUNIC + other international organisations	EU delegations, embassies, cultural agencies and bodies	Mostly cultural public sector and cultural professionals	Mix of cultural public sector, cultural professionals, wide public	Non-governmental, private and philanthropic cultural sectors

Table 4 - Potential avenues for enhanced EU external cultural action: strengths and weaknesses

Policy models→ ↓ Strengths & weaknesses	EU coordinated mainstreaming	Decentralised	National and state- centred	National coalitions of the willing	Privatised / network-based
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU image • Potential for coherence with other EU instruments + knowhow • EU critical mass as a block • EU funding compensating national shortages • Nation-branding preserved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proximity with cultural professionals • Better understanding of needs • Potential to export what is already being done locally and internally in Europe • Proximity with societies • Nation-branding preserved • Bottom-up approaches 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political support and back-up and knowhow • State guarantee for financial risk-taking • Nation-branding preserved • Large cultural networks abroad • Political and security risk-taking in volatile contexts • Potential for coherence with other external action instruments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pooling of national and other resources • Large cultural networks abroad • Political support • Diversity of cultural knowhow potentially combined with political and economic knowhow • EUNIC clusters potential and record • Easy access to EU delegations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proximity with cultural professionals • Better understanding of needs • Creative and political risk-taking • Diversity of cultural knowhow • Transnational, transregional and global potential • Flexibility, agility in communications modes • Good access to European Parliament
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for partners and contractors—top-down approaches • Lack of strategic cultural approach within EEAS and at political level • Lack of culture-sensitivity training • Lack of knowhow in cultural action • Lack of access to cultural professionals and their needs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of access to and knowledge of EU levels, institutions and funding • Lack of funding • Lack of political clout on sensitive issues (conflicts, democratisation) • Lack of cultural management methodology? • Lack of critical mass 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of funding or domination of the big 3 • Top-down and old-fashioned inefficient approaches • Nation-branding competition instead of cooperation and coordination • Lack of critical mass • Political constraints 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cumbersome EUNIC consensus-making procedures • Competition among national interests within EUNIC • Potential competition with networks and implementing organisations • Lack of access to EU funding • Lack of political awareness and/or realism among cultural professionals • Lack of European mindset among EUNIC members • Lack of solidarity among EUNIC members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of funding—fundraising imperatives constraining cooperative attitudes • Lack of access to political levels and EU levels and funding • Lack of political support when dealing with sensitive and politically incorrect themes

Each model has its particular strengths and weaknesses, as illustrated in table 4. The table may also help the reader to imagine what kind of linkages could be made between various policy models. For instance, if one model's weakness is a "lack of funding," one may imagine the ways it could be combined with another model offering substantial funding. Other complementary combinations are obviously possible, depending on which weak part of the table one may choose to look for some strength in other models to compensate it.

Certain models may prove useful when specific objectives are sought. For instance, network-based and rights-based models may be suitable when external cultural actions seek after global outreach, influence via social media, and large-scale audiences.⁹⁵ Outsourcing or privatisation models can apply to many kinds of external cultural action, but seem hardly convincing in politically sensitive contexts where trust-building between governments has to be ensured. On the contrary, multi-gearred models including cultural diplomacy clubbing and governmental political expertise can sometimes ease cultural cooperation or relations.

Box 4 - Revisiting and reinventing European cultural representation in the world

No matter which models or combinations are favoured by Europeans, adequate forms of European representation also need to match the diversity of external cultural action. A first basic approach related to public diplomacy and institutional communication is about ensuring EU visibility. This approach is relevant for funding institutions keen to ensure that credit is given for their support. Yet **European cultural representation is much more diverse than the visibility of EU institutions.**

In the short term, and for understandable reasons related to administrative and political barriers, it seems there is still little appetite from European governments to create fully-fledged European cultural houses abroad by pooling their individual resources into collective structures. In this context, several options could be envisaged.

An essential debate on European cultural representation relates to the idea of having **focal points** or European representatives **for cultural affairs within EU delegations.**⁹⁶ Such a recommendation was made by a European Parliament report in 2011 and has fostered a lot of debate. In the EEAS and the Commission, the author was told that many delegations actually have staff in charge of cultural programmes, although not full-time and not always with the right skills.⁹⁷

The EEAS and the DG EAC would be well advised to conduct **regular assessments of delegation performance in the field of external cultural relations**, with a view to taking adequate adjustment measures when necessary. Given the diversity of staff policies in EU delegations worldwide, it is to be expected that innovations and progress will take place at a different speed and under various formats. It will be of great importance to

⁹⁵ Clary Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2011, pp. 28-41.

⁹⁶ Presentation by Dr. Gerhard Sabathil, Director East Asia and the Pacific (EEAS), Informal Meeting of Senior Officials of Ministries of Culture and Senior Officials Responsible for Culture in Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 14 June 2012.

⁹⁷ Interviews with European Commission staff members, May 2012.

ensure that EU delegation staff are able to handle collaborative initiatives and to play a constructive role together with the member states and other agencies/entities specialising in cultural work. Another short-term option would be to **start with focal points/attachés where** (for instance in China, the United States, Brazil, Egypt and Burma) **there is a strong demand** from the third country, EU interest and the appetite to strengthen and enhance the culture dimension as well as people-to-people contacts. In the long run, ensuring European presence and representation will be about using dedicated spaces, both material and virtual, to allow for European cultural (and collaborative) projects to be accessible to all, and similarly to allow other cultures to interact with European cultures. European cultural hubs will eventually need to be more than mere “co-housing” policies. The focus should be on new working methods conducive to more cooperation, co-creation and the mutualisation of initiatives. Such **cultural hubs could be tentatively activated for the implementation of the pilot measures** suggested later in this study.

Cultural hubs could be located in various environments.⁹⁸ In the future, **architectural projects for cultural hubs** in host countries could also be a good occasion to encourage cooperation among European architects, together with their counterparts in the host countries. The same could also be said for language learning and training centres located within universities in third countries. Whatever options are chosen, it seems essential to **locate these European cultural spaces in popular and central areas where the largest public is present**. This could be the city’s downtown pedestrian areas, squares, or shopping malls.

Other **representation spaces could be immaterial and exist virtually thanks to new information and communication technologies**. This is the case with broadcasting TV and radio channels but also with web-based platforms, websites, blogs, resource centres, and education and learning facilities.⁹⁹

The pooling and sharing of a critical mass may sometimes become a reality. In the meantime, European governments—aided by European institutions—would be well advised to consider enhanced information sharing and European cooperation in joint European platforms/hubs located within existing structures/fora/institutes that could serve as catalysts to attract private-public partnerships. Such pilot projects could, for instance, be launched in symbolic countries of the neighbourhood or countries in heavy transitional processes.

⁹⁸ They can be specific buildings or dedicated parts of some buildings on European or even national premises. Their added value would lie in their potential for multidisciplinary cultural use, be they conference facilities, theatres, concert halls or cinemas. These spaces could either be located in existing Europa houses or European compounds or areas which already co-host several national European diplomatic missions and EU delegations. Alternatively, they could also be renamed national cultural institute premises placed at the disposal of all European cultural professionals by some national cultural agencies. A third option could be to consider the possibilities for the joint building of new European cultural centres or cultural houses abroad, where EUNIC clusters could locate their facilities while mutualising common cultural spaces for performances.

⁹⁹ A recent example is [Terramed+](#), a multilingual (French and Arabic) project funded by Euromed audiovisual III and implemented by RAI.

VI. Long-term proposals for enhanced European external cultural relations

1. Pioneering initiatives

To a large extent, the development of European external cultural action will depend on pioneering and innovative experience: within Europe; in its neighbourhood; but also anywhere in the world where Europeans will decide to join forces to engage collectively as multidimensional and multidisciplinary teams in cultural relations.

First, Europeans should agree on a set of basic principles (see box below) to guide their cultural action abroad. This will help build new narratives by combining new common concepts and principles, beyond the widely accepted “unity in diversity,” “mutuality” mottoes and “European decline” warning visions recalled in *Table 5*.

Box 5 - Ten policy principles for European external cultural relations

1. Recognise and promote multiple identities¹⁰⁰
2. Guarantee the existence of free open physical and cultural spaces¹⁰¹
3. Strive for policy coherence and synergy with other external relations policy tools and instruments
4. Preach what you culturally practice (to avoid double standards)
5. Empower European cultural representation beyond EU institutions to increase Europe’s cultural attractiveness¹⁰²
6. Ensure EU responsibility to provide support¹⁰³ and respect subsidiarity¹⁰⁴
7. Promote the UNESCO convention on cultural and linguistic diversity¹⁰⁵
8. Encourage double/mutual/reciprocal/interactive visibility¹⁰⁶
9. Seek convergence on addressing/discussing past, present and future challenges¹⁰⁷ in a self-critical way
10. Monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment in the short, medium and long term

¹⁰⁰ Katherine Watson, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 148.

¹⁰¹ “It has even got to the point where the argument has been made that Europe’s international cultural image and activities would be more successful if they were conceived and carried out without diplomatic influence.” Berthold Franke, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 174.

¹⁰² This can be done through the promotion of a powerful cultural image of Europe to attract larger tourist markets, share European values and protect human rights. This could also include efforts to increase exchanges in European cultural goods to contribute to European wealth and growth, while being cautious about the protection of a “cultural space” in trade relations.

¹⁰³ Delphine Borione, in *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 183.

¹⁰⁴ G. Wagner, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 120, Delphine Borione, in *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 183.

¹⁰⁵ Delphine Borione, in *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 181.

¹⁰⁶ Patapievi, p. 167.

¹⁰⁷ Katherine Watson, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 148, Mike Hardy, p. 142, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*. Doris Pack, Chair of the Culture Committee of the European Parliament, in the *MEDIA MUNDUS brochure 2011*, p. 5, speaks of a “European dream,” while Berthold Franke suggests being “both realistic and utopian,” *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 176.

Ultimately, what should be worked out is a sort of **European quality charter for external cultural relations** that would reconcile diverging opinions about definitions, policy models and external cultural policy traditions. Such a charter could be a mix of policy principles and conclusions from public debate as well as best practices. There are, for instance, several concepts that could be developed or researched further,¹⁰⁸ as suggested in *Table 5*. Neologisms are also worth further investigation, like dozens of other clever plays on words that could actually be starting points for adequate reformulations of what Europeans can do together.

The relevance of the very word “culture” also has to be revisited, especially given the fact that current leaders in EU institutions seem to be more convinced by the incorporation of culture within educational policies than by the value of cultural action per se.¹⁰⁹ In policy terms, experts would be advised to unpack the relationship between educational and cultural policies and to look for approaches that would make their distinction irrelevant to coherent action.¹¹⁰

Second, **the creation of a network of European cultural ambassadors or patrons** ought to be considered a priority. Such ambassadors would be assigned specific thematic mandates in a given region, with a view to attracting the attention of the media, the wider public and young people on promising ongoing cultural initiatives. Such a system of cultural patronage by famous cultural figures, known for their cultural sensitivity and knowledge of cultural etiquette, would help increase the image of Europe as a constructive, modern, globalised and flexible driver of change, beyond the clichés of EU bureaucracies, national postcolonial imperialisms and societal xenophobic prejudices. Every year, six famous European artists could be appointed as cultural ambassadors with a to-be-negotiated mandate matching their personal area of interest. These patrons could then perform the role of catalysts for stronger European synergies behind common cultural causes related to European cultural priorities. As put by one of the interviewees for this study: in the case of China “We need an energiser who could go to all the stakeholders and networks and identify Chinese interlocutors, partners and so on. This person or body would have a foot in both camps.”¹¹¹ Cultural ambassadors could be mandated by top-level European cultural, political, economic, social and religious leaders to generate genuine interest among potential patrons. They could also be selected on the basis of their engagement in decentralised cultural relations, at the level of a city or a region.¹¹²

Third, thanks to the network of European cultural ambassadors, new visions and narratives will help to formulate, where appropriate, **thematic and geographically focused cultural strategies** (limited in

¹⁰⁸ “Around 6 in 10 (58%) say that globalisation will infuse the continent’s culture with a new dynamism as well as helping expand its influence in the world. Yet, at the same time, only a marginally lower figure (53%) believe globalisation to be a threat to European culture and that measures should be taken to counter this.” [2007 Eurobarometre on cultural values](#).

¹⁰⁹ Phone interviews with MEP Marjiete Schaake and with a cultural expert close to EUNIC, May 2012.

¹¹⁰ In this context, one concept would be worthwhile exploring and unpacking: learning. Instead of speaking of European cultural external relations, perhaps one should start thinking of *European (external) learning policies*. This phrasing implies a mutual learning process, a humble listening attitude, and encompasses all the dimensions of cultural work. However, it may run the risk of being too closely associated with educational policies as such.

¹¹¹ Phone interview with a cultural expert working on a European cultural strategy vis-à-vis China, May 2012.

¹¹² The experience of the city of Lyon, with the [OnlyLyon blog](#) developed by the local ADERLY agency, aims at identifying the city’s ambassadors, including cultural ones.

numbers) and to associate them systematically with **action plans and adequate funding**. The work currently being done on a commendable European cultural strategy towards China leads to some doubt, however, about the degree of political weight European states want to put into the exercise.

Fourth, cultural strategy preparation and implementation, and the lessons learned on the role of culture in external relations, will need to be shared and disseminated through **knowledge and expertise networks on European external cultural relations, with ramifications in professional training and school and university teaching curricula all over Europe**. This mechanism will ensure that public debate on this field will reach the widest public.

Table 5 - A selection of concepts and narratives guiding European external cultural relations

Existing narratives and concepts	Unity in diversity	Mutuality	European decline	Need for new concepts and narratives
Reference	Most of official EU and national statements and documents	British Council, EUNIC	“Europe is a declining global force economically, militarily and in relation to other multipolar influences. Adding a cultural pillar (...) should now become a priority.” ¹¹³	“Narratives that we share, which are of course best communicated externally once they are understood and embraced internally.” Katherine Watson, EUNIC Yearbook 2011, p. 148. Gottfried Wagner, EUNIC Yearbook 2011, p. 119
Inspiring concepts	Culture sensitivity	Inviolability of the cultural space	The cultural dimension of society’s openness	Spiritual secularism
Reference	Inspired by the term “conflict sensitivity”	Inspired by the concept of “humanitarian space”	In reference to the concept of Open society developed by George Soros ¹¹⁴	Radu Mihăileanu
Inspiring concepts	Cultural ecologies	imaginative spheres		
Reference	Malte Bergmann	Pierre Giner		
Examples of inspiring neologisms	Afropea	Europalia	Europe-halles	European (external) learning policies

¹¹³ Robert Palmer, *EUNIC Yearbook 2011*, p. 92.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Helga Trüpel, MEP, Vice President of the Culture committee.

2. Combining external cultural policy models: towards a common practice

New concepts and European external cultural innovations will emerge in sufficiently creative environments. The challenge lies in a) the way cultural professionals communicate with non-culture-related external relations professionals; b) the ways synergies will be found between all stakeholders involved in the policy models presented in *Table 3*. Ranking below does not indicate any specific order of priority.

The first synergy to be sought is between **state-centred actions and EU-led policies** (EU-coordinated mainstreaming). EUNIC and Member States should engage the EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG EAC and EU delegations to design and imagine new intensified modes of cooperation on the basis of best practices in Senegal, Istanbul, inter alia.¹¹⁵

A second kind of synergy should be developed between **EUNIC, Member States and civil society networks**, to avoid unnecessary competition and to maximise the experiences and skills of both networks. In that case, EUNIC and Member States could offer networks to make proposals for joint initiatives for Europeanised action together with EUNIC clusters in a number of geographic and thematic areas.¹¹⁶

These first two attempts to combine policy models will probably shed some light on existing or upcoming cooperation experiences among a number of European country organisations (**coalitions of the willing**) that may take place outside the EUNIC framework but that could still be considered as European endeavours. Being aware of these experiences is essential to maintain approaches that are creative and flexible.

A third form of synergy has to develop between **civil society networks and EU institutions to improve the level of information on EU funding opportunities**. However, knowing the lack of flexibility of EU procedures, some specific work should be done on the possibilities to make EU funding more agile and accessible to small- and medium-sized cultural organisations and enterprises.

Fourthly, in the field of global and European cultural regulation, **EU Member States** should take the initiative, **together with civil society networks**, to make the case for strong protection of the cultural sector in trade regulations, and of Internet access equality in new media regulations. The protection of linguistic diversity should also be addressed within this framework.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ The EUNIC strategy group should be asked to design a detailed strategy of engagement with EU delegations, comprising key objectives (for instance, joint funding with EU delegations, cultural sector capacity building, etc.), key targets (a list of priority countries and contact points in delegations and EUNIC clusters) and key partners to consult with (local cultural professionals, other non-European cultural organisations or sponsors), and key criteria for joint engagement (listening modes, mutuality, monitoring and evaluation, degree of political interference), to name but a few.

¹¹⁶ The combination of the forces of civil society networks and of Member States will be essential in creating a critical lobbying mass to push for cultural budget targets in ongoing financial perspective negotiations. Partnership strategies with other non-European partners should of course be envisaged at the very beginning of this planning process.

¹¹⁷ The creation of a network of European cultural ambassadors might be helpful in that respect, given the notoriety of the patrons who would be appointed.

Fifth, **cultural mainstreaming within EU institutions** will only happen if EU policy-making is receptive to **outside and field-based expertise**,¹¹⁸ suggestions, cooperation, consultations and pressure. This would work for the clarification of cultural functions within EU delegations through more systematic data-gathering on the state of play of available multidisciplinary funding, including cultural components at deconcentrated delegation level¹¹⁹.

Last but not least, synergies must be sought between the **cultural public and private sector (including foundations), philanthropic cultural actors and civil societies**. Gathering knowledge and data on the added value of culture, best practice and perceptions of Europe in the world is an extremely large agenda that European states and cultural agencies or civil society networks cannot address alone. They need the cooperation of research and private firms which have the human, financial and technological resources to contribute to fact- and research-based cultural policies.

VII. Changing gear: towards feasibility studies for pilot measures in the European neighbourhood

On paper, the EU, its member states and civil societies seem committed to enhancing Europe's cultural relations with the world. In practice, though, the glass is still half-empty. Europeans now have to make cultural Europe really happen by breaking new ground in certain specific areas. Given the strategic relevance of its neighbourhood and the recent transformations taking place,¹²⁰ Europe should try to implement and test new ideas in this region, while continuing its external cultural sector reform elsewhere.

1. Pilot measures in the Southern Neighbourhood

- **Measure 1: A rapid cultural reaction mechanism.** Before all else, what is of utmost importance is to closely monitor ongoing changes, to listen to cultural professionals involved in current transformations and to give them concrete support through reactive and rapid action.¹²¹ This, for instance, could take the form of some sort of **rapid cultural reaction mechanism in volatile contexts**, the features of which would be examined by a mix of experts from the EU, Member States and civil society. One dimension of this mechanism could be to support the efforts of some networks to focus on the human rights of artists in times of political and societal uncertainty.¹²²

¹¹⁸ A good example as far as trade relations are concerned are the cultural provisions of the [2011 KEA/ECDPM evaluation of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership agreement](#).

¹¹⁹ Instead of leading these efforts from Brussels alone, more work needs to be done within EUNIC clusters in coordination with the EUNIC Brussels office, to identify needs and shortcomings within EU delegations on cultural issues, and to feed into the EUNIC secretariat's work on cultural mainstreaming across the EU institutional environment.

¹²⁰ Some background on EU cultural work in the Southern Mediterranean is provided in the annexes.

¹²¹ Phone interview with Catherine Cornet and Chrystelle Lucas, May and June 2012.

¹²² Phone interview with Mary Ann DeVlieg, May 2012.

- **Measure 2: Improved cultural visa delivery.** European national institutes for culture or other cultural agencies and embassies should be much more pro-active in setting up mechanisms to facilitate visa access for cultural professionals.¹²³
- **Measure 3: A programme called the “European cultural leadership programme,”** based on the need for “more training and capacity-building at medium- and small-organisation level in cultural management, since many of the existing cultural organisations are still managed by foreigners or amateurs.”¹²⁴

Such specific programme could perhaps be launched in the framework of the EU’s instrument for stability as a true violence-prevention and peace-building measure, or EIDHR or the Endowment for Democracy, the civil society facility. It ought to include cultural professionals from the region, be coordinated with relevant organisations and local authorities that already have experience of developing local cultural sectors in Europe. The programme should be light, flexible in its management, and mobile around the region, to bring trainers and trainees together easily, with free mobility allowed by a cultural pass for one year. To avoid delays, it should not be subject to calls for tender. It could be inspired by the lessons learnt from past cultural-management training seminars already organised by professional organisations within Europe and abroad.¹²⁵ It would require preliminary diplomatic and consular work by EU Member States, with some strong encouragement from the EEAS and its delegations in the region.
- **Measure 4: Another pilot project ought to be decentralised support for cultural incubators in the big cities** of the region. Feasibility studies should be undertaken for such initiatives, with identification of the relevant funding mechanisms, criteria on what to avoid (location in European premises for instance) and what to prioritise (quick funding and reaction, small amounts, autonomy of the cultural sector thanks to core funding), and how to encourage decentralised approaches (opening up to new interlocutors such as Mediterranean chambers of commerce).¹²⁶
- **Measure 5: Develop more cultural work within Europe itself on cultural and religious relations** involving Muslim/non-Muslim, Arab/non-Arab-speaking and Mediterranean-focused publics and citizens.¹²⁷
- **Measure 6: Open up existing Euro-Mediterranean frameworks to the rest of the world** to match existing Mediterranean globalised orientations and connexions.

¹²³ One avenue could be to create some sort of consular contact points within EUNIC clusters, in close coordination with the competent national authorities (ministries of interior, etc.) in charge of visa delivery. Alternatively, cultural contact points within national European consulates could also be envisaged. Phone interview with Catherine Cornet, May 2012.

¹²⁴ Phone interview with Catherine Cornet, May 2012.

¹²⁵ All the training material should be immediately available on an EU official website like, for instance, DEVCO’s Capacity 4 Dev.

¹²⁶ Phone interviews with Ferdinand Richard, May 2012.

¹²⁷ One example of such initiatives is probably the “Our shared Europe” report by the British Council, as well as the “Muslims in Europe OSI-sponsored campaign” on European diversity. This surely should be done in cooperation with local authorities and cultural professionals within Europe, and could perhaps benefit for sustained EU funding within the framework of its cultural programme, structural funding, and European capitals of culture, as a prolongation and/or strengthening of existing projects (like Banlieues d’Europe) mainly focusing on writing experiences.

- **Measure 7:** In parallel, in rapidly evolving contexts (at least in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt), **new mapping exercises** aimed at drawing an overall picture of the cultural sectors in the region are absolutely necessary, and the results of this mapping should take the form of publicly available tools accessible permanently online. This initiative should benefit from the work already done, and currently being done, by some expert organisations.
- **Measure 8:** Meanwhile, an **independent evaluation of the work of the Anna Lindh Foundation** should be carried out to assess the relevance of the concept in the light of a moving global cultural environment and of the consequences of the Arab Spring in the region.¹²⁸
- **Measure 9: TV and radio cultural programmes for the Neighbourhood.** In the next 2-5 years, following the concept of the TerraMed+ programme, European and Mediterranean TV and radio should be supported to develop a Mediterranean programme (in Arabic) and an Eastern European programme (in various languages) in cooperation with cultural journalists from the Neighbourhood countries.

2. Pilot measures in the Eastern Neighbourhood

- **Measure 1: More inclusiveness:** within the perspective of enlargement in the long term and of association agreements, cultural relations should be intensified by more systematically including non-EU states from Eastern Europe in existing intra-EU cultural, scientific and educational exchange programmes. This could be financed through specific actions within the new EU cultural programme, but also Youth in Action, ERASMUS and TEMPUS, to name but a few.
- **Measure 2: A European cultural learning pass/path** (see above), including easier access to cultural visas.
- **Measure 3: A culture and human rights initiative.** This measure should aim at supporting cultural professionals in countries or regions where their rights are threatened. Such programmes could be jointly funded by the Endowment for Democracy and the Neighbourhood Instrument.
- **Measure 4: A cultural freedom broadcasting programme for Belarus.** This initiative would be dedicated to providing Belarus people with cultural products from Europe in Russian and other languages, via satellite and the Internet, with the objective of promoting fundamental rights and European democratic values. This initiative could be a pioneering measure to test new ground in the broadcasting sector.
- **Measure 5: Support for the twinning of Western and Eastern European festivals** by engaging with existing initiatives in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

¹²⁸ Several interviewees pointed to the shortcomings of the foundation's politically founded architecture, its unclear mandate and roadmap, the unintended effect of encouraging a kind of "cultural and institutional clubbing phenomenon" and the limitations of its location in Alexandria, a "rather isolated and culturally sidelined city." Phone interviews, May and June 2012.

- **Measure 6: Enlarging the geographical reach of European capitals of culture (ECOC) to the Eastern Neighbourhood, or at least sharing their experience** , while creating a parallel programme for Mediterranean capitals of culture.¹²⁹
- **Measure 7: Reinforcing existing large-scale cultural dialogue initiatives between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies** in regional frameworks, through increased usage of new media and mobility.
- **Measure 8: In the long run, systematising and intensifying education-twinning and cooperation exchanges** could have a very strong impact on our societies: inviting students with grants on a larger scale, developing school-twinning, and sponsoring young Europeans to teach or to do volunteer work in cultural and educational structures in the Neighbourhood countries should become part of curricula all over the European continent, and not the exotic exception for a lucky few.
- **Measure 9: Appointing a committee of experts mandated to provide “scenarios for a restructuring of European cultural architecture”** addressing current and future challenges to existing institutional constraints and opportunities, looking at the role of civil society, and drawing conclusions about globalisation on the European cultural landscape.

What all the measures suggested above have in common is the same rationale of not repeating the mistakes of the past and of avoiding old fashioned, inefficient, postcolonial cultural policy models that have proven highly counter-productive in their impact on the relationships between EU citizens and citizens from the European Neighbourhood. What will certainly have to be avoided in the future is large-scale, slow, bureaucracy-led initiatives.

VIII. Conclusions

1. Main findings

European external cultural relations are very much a work in progress, but it is not an exotic or surrealistic policy field anymore. Definitions and concepts will continue to be discussed at length, and the time is right to reinvent narratives. Thinking in terms of “European external learning policies” is just one example among many others. The search for common policy principles—some of which have been presented in this study—will allow some fine-tuning in the design of tailored cultural strategies.

The good news, though, is that debates have very much shifted from justification narratives (*Why culture matters*) towards implementation strategies (*How to enhance more cultural Europe in the world*). It seems that efforts to gather knowledge and formulate best practice strategies have been fruitful and should be encouraged. What is still strongly missing in the picture of European external cultural action is more fluid communication and mutual learning as well as collective action-oriented strategic thinking among those who are or could be part of it.

¹²⁹ Should this prove impossible in the short term, one option would be to extend the future rules for ECOC bidders by providing vivid “European” connections with cities in third countries.

This study suggests that there are at least five types of external cultural policy models in play that involve around a dozen interest groups and expertise communities in Europe. This means that there is certainly no single way of thinking, promoting and implementing more cultural Europe in the world. What should be sought is more efficiency in the combination of existing policy models through more frequent collective and conjoint practice, policy innovation and pioneering measures. To foster debate and inspire further research, some ideas for **short-, medium- and long-term measures**—with particular focus on the European Neighbourhood—are presented in the study and are summarised below:

Long-term measures

1. To establish a quality charter for European external cultural relations
2. To create a network of European cultural ambassadors
3. To design thematic and geographically focused cultural strategies with action plans and adequate funding
4. To develop and support knowledge and expertise networks on European external cultural relations, with ramifications in professional training, school and university teaching curricula as well as civil society organisations all over Europe

Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood

5. A rapid cultural reaction mechanism
6. Improved cultural visa delivery
7. A programme called “European cultural learning pass/path”
8. Decentralised support of cultural incubators in big cities
9. Cultural work within Europe itself on cultural and religious relations
10. Opening up existing Euro-Mediterranean frameworks to the rest of the world
11. Independent evaluation of the work of the Anna Lindh Foundation
12. European TV and radio cultural programmes for and with the Neighbourhood

Eastern Neighbourhood

13. Culture sensitivity training for EU programming staff in delegations
14. A culture and human rights initiative
15. A cultural freedom broadcasting programme for Belarus
16. Support twinning between Western and Eastern festivals
17. Enlarging the geographical scope of European capitals of culture (ECOC)
18. Large-scale cultural dialogue initiatives between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies
19. Systematising and intensifying education twinning and cooperation exchanges
20. Providing “scenarios for a restructuring of the European cultural architecture”

2. The way forward

Considering the variety of objectives and challenges related to European external cultural relations (illustrated in figure 2), European policy-makers should clarify what desired outcomes they are seeking along a series of benchmarks. This conclusion suggests some of them.

The first outcome is the increase of the cultural component in all the areas covered by the EU's external relations. This will be achieved if more stakeholders have become more aware of the value of culture in foreign affairs. Tangible results would materialise in a significant increase in resources available for culture-related initiatives within the spectrum of external policies and actions. According to this logic, the number of programmes and projects comprising cultural components or being culture-sensitive should also increase. **Budget targets should be envisaged, like, for instance, the 1.7% dedicated to culture within EU regional funds, which could be matched in the field of external action.** Awareness-raising would be a success if there were more teaching and learning on the role and the impact of culture. Culture will matter once high-level and skilled European policy-makers from the EEAS, Member States and civil society start engaging in the drafting of pilot cultural thematic or geographical strategies. The second outcome is related to the enhanced Europeanisation of approaches, with an increase in European collective initiatives, in various formats, be they EU policies, but also national and civil society ones at state and local level. The third outcome concerns the synergies between internal cultural policies and initiatives in Europe on the one hand, and their internationalisation on the other, either through export-oriented models or via measures aiming at targeting foreign publics visiting Europe or consuming European cultural goods.

As for the More Europe campaign, its future impact may lie in the establishment of sustainable mechanisms and tools that will allow it to continue in forms different to the current ones. It will depend on the appropriation of the themes and narratives of the campaign by the whole range of its stakeholders: the strengthening of knowledge-production capacities on European external cultural relations (within and outside the European network on cultural statistics); multi-year research programmes in academia and think tanks; the multi-year planning of training activities within EU, national and civil society organisations on the value of culture in European external relations, and the creation of audiovisual advocacy tools (video clips in particular) summarising the campaign's main messages in a user-friendly, pedagogical and multilingual manner that could be used and spread on all sorts of web-based information spaces as well as being broadcast on TV and radio.

The most challenging area, the impact of which not only the campaign but all experts will have to work on, is probably the interrelation between the political dimension and the cultural component of European cultural policies, between the diplomatic community on the one hand and the culturally sensitive expert communities on the other, to find ways of clarifying the boundaries of political interference in external cultural action. According to the author, the tension between cultural influence and political agendas should be the object of a specific structured consultation dialogue between the EUNIC presidency, other cultural platforms from civil society and cultural research centres, the EEAS and the Member States, and should focus on very specific case studies and areas. The main objective of such a dialogue should be the drafting of a charter for European external cultural relations clarifying the principles along which they should be conducted. Only then will current mistrust or misinformation about more cultural Europe in the world between and among various European agencies and communities be overcome.

ANNEXES

I. External cultural action in the Southern Neighbourhood: background

Most EU cultural programmes in the Southern Mediterranean are regional ones, since very few countries (Algeria) have actually decided to make culture one of their priorities in their bilateral relationship with the EU.¹³⁰ Since the mid-1990s, the EU has focused on intercultural dialogue and the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation as the main engine for cultural relations in the region. It took several years for the foundation to clarify its mandate, to shift it from cultural sponsoring towards more enduring intercultural dialogue between societies.¹³¹ Other EU programmes (Euromed audiovisual, heritage) are regional in nature. Despite the best intentions of the EU, this grant-making system is said to present several shortcomings: firstly, it encourages and maintains domination by European/Northern Mediterranean cultural professionals over their counterparts in the South.¹³² Secondly, it has *de facto* pushed non-Europeans to transform themselves into “professional fundraisers.”

The Arab Spring, which has taken everyone by surprise, has now created unstable situations (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria), inertia (Algeria) or uncertainty (Morocco), and it has become increasingly difficult to know how to approach cultural sectors in the region. There is a clear feeling of fatigue to do with the European grant-making approach.¹³³

Clearly, certain topics and even words have become very sensitive after the Arab Spring: women, identity, Islam, pluralism, diversity, dialogue. There is a general fatigue about these themes among the Arab cultural sector, within which many think that they can raise these issues by themselves and without the support of foreigners. What is valued today is the return of the individual, beyond any kind of simplistic categorisation (veiled woman, Islamic artist, etc.).

Furthermore, in the Arab world the image of Europe has become tarnished over the years because of increasing Islamophobia there, because of debates on the veil, and because of the behaviour of certain leaders (in France, for example). Moreover, European civil society organisations, as leaders of most cross-Mediterranean cultural consortia, have often ended up imitating their governments by performing the role of law-enforcer and monitor of administrative compliance. This calls for Europeans to reflect on the need to first refrain from cultural export-oriented approaches.

¹³⁰ Phone interview with a European Commission staff member dealing with the European Neighbourhood, May 2012.

¹³¹ Phone interviews with European Commission staff members and cultural experts dealing with the Neighbourhood and the Mediterranean region in particular, May and June 2012.

¹³² Phone interview with Ferdinand Richard, May 2012. For instance, only 27% of leading organisations in Anna Lindh Foundation-funded projects are from the South.

¹³³ “It would be a mistake for national cultural institutes and European organisations to suggest themes of cultural activity in the region.” Phone interview with Catherine Cornet, May 2012. It was also noted that German organisations are seen to be in a more listening and learning mode than the French ones which, despite being the most active European nation in the region, have a reputation for displaying a “know-it-all” attitude.

Other cultural experts from the region itself are recommending a thorough and participatory mapping and review of their national cultural policy, as in Morocco or Egypt, for instance. However, social change requires time and patience.¹³⁴

Despite dramatic changes in the last year or so, one remaining priority is to work on migration and mobility issues.¹³⁵ It has also been acknowledged that the bilateral EU-Mediterranean framework of cooperation has become largely outdated. Cultural professionals in the MENA region are now fully plugged into globalised and multilateral networks.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Association pour le développement culturel au Maroc et en Afrique, *Diagnostic et état des lieux de l'art et de la culture au Maroc, Vers des Etats Généraux de la culture*, 2012. Phone interview with a European Commission staff member working on the Southern Neighbourhood.

¹³⁵ Phone interview with Catherine Cornet, May 2012 . Because of the difficulty of obtaining visas, "In every conference or meeting, there are always 3 or 4 people who are absent because they didn't manage to get their visa on time. Those who are always present have their own access to visas. The result of this situation is that you always see the same usual suspects in important meetings between European and the Mediterranean region."

¹³⁶ Phone interview with Catherine Cornet, May 2012.

II. External cultural action in the Eastern Neighbourhood: background

In the Eastern Neighbourhood, EU programmes and policies on culture are very recent. However, national action plans within the framework of Neighbourhood policy have explicit and substantial cultural components.¹³⁷ Historically, the Council of Europe has played a leading role in supporting cultural sectors in these countries, very often thanks to EU funding. However, given the dynamics fostered by new enlargement perspectives and new association agreements with the EU, some new thinking is necessary about the European architecture of cultural cooperation and policies. Existing overlaps of competences between the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and the role of EU Member States as a collective political force within these multilateral organisations should be revisited in the name of a more cooperative and collective approach.¹³⁸ It has become absurd to have 27 different EU voices within such frameworks, whereas joint representation would actually lead to a much stronger leverage on cultural issues, as well as on culture-related themes like the rule of law, youth and fundamental rights.

¹³⁷ Phone interview with an EEAS staff member working on the Eastern Neighbourhood, May 2012.

¹³⁸ Phone interview with Robert Palmer, former director for culture, education and democratic governance at the Council of Europe, June 2012. For him, the working relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe is still “a pretty ad hoc recipe.”